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I. INTRODUCTION
At the end of 1988, the combined external indebtedness of the third
world' (referred to below as less developed countries or "LDCs") was
estimated at nearly $1.3 trillion.2 In the same year, the United Nations
agency United Nations International Childrens' Emergency Fund
("UNICEF") attributed the deaths of 650,000 children in LDCs to re-
* Jon H. Sylvester. J.D., Harvard Law School, 1981, Professor of Law, Loyola Law School,
Los Angeles, and Fulbright Professor, University of Nairobi Faculty of Law. The author gratefully
acknowledges the assistance of Ruth Busch, Mark Calahan and Michael Collins. Loyola Law
School Professors Jennifer Friesen, Lary Lawrence, Chris May and Lawrence B. Solum were espe-
cially helpful in reading early drafts and providing specific and constructive criticism. Research for
this work was made possible by a grant from Loyola Law School.
I The term "third world" has, to a significant extent, been replaced by "Less Developed Coun-
tries" ("LDCs"). The third world includes those sovereign states that resulted from the decoloniza-
tion of the late 1950s and early 1960s. These nations were distinct from both the Western and
Eastern bloc nations and, thus, were said to constitute a "third world." 21 Britannica 813 (15th ed.
1988).
2 Jerome I. Levinson, A Perspective on the Debt Crisis 4 Am. U. J. INT'L L. & PoL'Y 489,
(1989).
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duction in basic living standards caused by diversion of resources to serv-
icing external debt.3 Some experts say prospects for solving this huge
and growing problem are actually growing worse due to "debt fatigue."4
There are three major categories of LDC debtor countries: Latin
America, South-East Asia, and sub-Saharan Africa.5 This article focuses
on sub-Saharan Africa because sub-Saharan Africa is so clearly the "sick
man" of the world economy, with many of that region's countries actu-
ally experiencing negative economic growth.6 Sixteen of the world's 25
least developed countries are in sub-Saharan Africa.7 In nearly all sub-
Saharan African countries, most of the population subsists in abject
poverty.8
It is arguable that only something in the nature of a Marshall Plan,
perhaps at United Nations initiative and direction, has any chance of
reversing sub-Saharan Africa's acceleration toward economic collapse.9
It is clear that substantial debt relief is an indispensable step in the right
3 In a report issued on December 20, 1991, UNICEF said massive debt relief for sub-Saharan
Africa is indispensable to any meaningful effort to save significant numbers of that region's children.
4 The term "debt fatigue" is used to describe the malaise, or generalized lack of energy and
optimism, that sometimes seems to permeate the issue of third world debt. Ramesh C. Garg, Explor-
ing Solutions to the LDC Debt Crisis, BANKERS MAGAZINE, Jan.- Feb. 1989, at 46.
5 See Carsten T. Ebenroth, The Changing Legal Framework for Resolving the Debt Crisiv A
European's Perspective, 23 INT'L LAW. 629, 630 (1989) [hereinafter Ebenroth] (explaining that,
while these categories are essentially geographic, the same result can be reached "[bly taking the
distinctive features of the absolute extent of indebtedness, its relation to the GNP, the ratio between
debt service and export revenues, the nature of the debt, the indebted country's concept of economic
policy, its political system, its stage of development, and its resources .... (footnotes omitted))
6 Sub-Saharan Africa's real gross domestic product ("GDP") has grown by 2.3% per year dur-
ing the past three years, but population has grown faster during the same period, so real GDP per
capita has been falling by 0.7% per year. Remembering Africa, EcONOMIsT, Aug. 31, 1991, at 33.
See also, eg., Tanzania: Government Committed to Promote Foreign Investment, FOREIGN TAX LAW
BI-WEEKLY BULLETIN, FOREIGN TAX LAW PUBLISHERS, INc., Volumes 27 and 28, July 3 and 10,
1991, at 1.
7 0. ABOYADE, ISSUES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF TROPICAL AFRICA 8 (1976).
8 A.W. Clausen, Financing Development in the Third World, BANKERS MAGAZINE, May-June
1985, at 12. The Los Angeles Times has reported that "Africa has a near-monopoly on the bottom
rankings of countries in terms of social welfare. Six of the ten countries with the lowest life expec-
tancies in the world are African.... Six of the countries with the lowest literacy rates and eight of
the 10 countries with the lowest rate of access to safe water are also in sub-Saharan Africa." Michael
A. Hiltzik, Africa's Future" Riding the Train to Nowhere, L.A. TIMES, July 17, 1990, at H-i. Sub-
Saharan Africa includes 47 countries and approximately 7.4 million square miles of territory.
ABOYADE, Supra, note 7, at 1.
9 This suggestion is neither novel nor sufficiently precise. "In recent years the op-ed pages of
the heavyweight newspapers have bulged with candidates for Marshallisation: Africa, the Arab
world, Eastern Europe - and now the Soviet Union.... Like most familiar phrases, the 'Marshall
plan' has gradually grown vaguer and vaguer. Today it tends to mean a bold initiative that involves
spending lots of money. This scarcely reflects why the original Marshall plan worked, or in what
circumstances a new one might work again." The Marshall Plan: Doing Well by Doing Good, ECON-
OMIST, June 15, 1991, at 30.
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direction." The United States government has announced its intention
to cancel some of the debts it is owed by certain sub-Saharan govern-
ments, and it is expected that some other Western countries will follow
suit.' The U.S. plan is conditional,12 however, and would not, in any
event, affect the huge debt owed to the International Monetary Fund, the
World Bank or private lending institutions.
The imposition of conditions on debt relief makes it clear that debt
relief is generally viewed as a concession, or perhaps merely a favor, to
the debtor. The purpose of this article is to propose a fundamental
reconceptualization of the sub-Saharan debt crisis based on the applica-
tion of certain well established contractual principles to an international
setting that has not generally been considered from a contract law per-
spective. 3 More important than their potential use in litigation which,
for reasons discussed below, is unlikely, these legal doctrines can contrib-
ute to resolving the sub-Saharan debt crisis by helping to foster a new
consensus (among government policy makers, lenders and the concerned
public) about the origins and nature of the problem.
The inescapable, central fact of the sub-Saharan debt crisis is the
10 In a recent speech to the United Nations General Assembly, Nigerian President Ibrahim
Babangida, who is also Chairman of the Organization of African Unity, said ".. . Africa's indebted-
ness is the single major obstacle to development in the continent[.] The debt problem is a central
element of Africa's critical economic situation. Africa's debt is crippling." Stanley Meisler, Trying
to Find Relief, Less-Developed Nations Ask Debt Forgiveness, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 11, 1991, at A5. A
conference of the Institute for African Alternatives, held in London in September, 1987, concluded
that "Africa's foreign debts.. .[have to] be cancelled by the creditors, or repudiated collectively by
all African countries." Conference Closing Statement and Alternative Proposals on Debt and Recon-
struction in Africa, in THE IMF, THE WORLD BANK AND THE AFRICAN DEBT CRIsis, 191, 197
(Bade Onimode, ed., Zed Books Ltd. 1989).
11 Annan Amegbe, Debt Relief and Growth Prospects in sub-Saharan Africa, 15 J. Soc. POL. &
ECON. STUD. 225 (1990).
12 The U.S. plan for sub-Saharan African debt forgiveness is conditioned largely upon economic
reform in the debtor countries (see infra Part III, B-D). In some instances, however, debt forgive-
ness is more directly tied to short-term self-interest in traditional, geopolitical terms. The Cable
News Network reported on September 10, 1991, that the U.S. government had forgiven $42 million
in debt owed by the government of Senegal in exchange for Senegal's commitment of troops to help
end the civil war in Liberia.
13 Three particularly relevant recent works on third world debt have come to the attention of
this author. Each views the problem from a different legal angle: (1) Yacob Haile-Mariam, Legal
and Other Justifications for Writing-off the Debts of the Poor Third World Countries: The Case of
Africa South of the Sahara, 20 1. WORLD TRADE L. 57, is a short piece focusing on exchange control
acts, sovereign immunity, and the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary fund. (2)
John Baloro, African Responses to the Debt Crisis: the relevance ofpublic international law, 23 COMP.
INT'L L.J. S. AFR. 139 (1990), as its title makes clear, focuses on public international law - arguing,
inter alia for application of the law of treaties. (3) Jacob Dollinger, Solution of Latin-American
External Debt by Internacional [siclArbitration, XVII Cunso DE DERECHO INTERNATIONAL (Aug.
1990), focuses primarily on procedural means, rather than doctrinal bases, for resolving the Latin
American debt crisis.
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objective inability of the borrowers to repay the loans. Most LDC debt-
ors facing this situation have adopted a policy under which "they an-
nounce their inability fully to meet their obligations, set out all the
extenuating economic or other reasons for their difficulty and offer to pay
what is possible in the circumstances." 14 This policy has come to be
known as "conciliatory default."15 As a practical matter, widespread
adoption of such a policy was virtually inevitable. This article argues,
however, that such a policy is also consistent with certain well estab-
lished principles of United States contract law,16 and that these principles
excuse the debtor nations of sub-Saharan Africa from any obligation to
repay the great majority of the external debt now ascribed to them.
The premise underlying this assertion involves an analogy to the
central concept of bankruptcy: that, under certain circumstances, debt
that cannot be repaid is conclusively discharged by operation of law. 17
This article does not discuss bankruptcy, however, because there is no
such procedural device available to sovereign debtors.18 In the interna-
tional context, the contractual doctrines presented below serve, in effect,
as a surrogate for such a device. These doctrines have not generally been
applied in this way to transactions between private parties in the domes-
tic context precisely because various forms of bankruptcy are available to
such parties as a "last resort." In the context of international sovereign
lending, the logical extension of these contractual doctrines into the void
left by the absence of a bankruptcy regime leads inevitably to the conclu-
sion that severely distressed sovereign borrowers owe no more of their
external debt than they can reasonably repay.
14 United Nations Center on Transnational Corporations, International Debt Restructuring: Sub-
stantive Issues and Techniques, at 55, U.N. Doc. ST/CTC/SER.B/4, U.N. Sales No. E. 89.II.A.10
(1989).
15 Id.
16 The civil law tradition is older and more widely distributed than the common law tradition
and, a fortiori, United States contract law. The position advanced in this article, however, is not
dependent on technical choice of law issues. Quite apart from its role in resolving disputes that are
actually litigated, legal doctrine plays an at least equally important role in structuring parties' expec-
tations. In this regard, it is the hegemony of Anglo-American common law principles, as a central
part of the relatively homogeneous ideologies of the (western) lenders' cultures, that is key. More-
over, "most international loan agreements provide for the jurisdiction of either the United States or
English courts [and] for the application of United States (New York) or English law .. " Interna-
tional Debt Restructuring, supra note 14, at 53.
17 For an excellent discussion of the economic and psychological rationale for, and ramifications
of, discharge, see, Thomas H. Jackson, The Fresh-Start Policy in Bankruptcy Law, 98 Harv. L. Rev.
1393 (1985). See also, Douglas G. Baird, THE ELEMENTS OF BANKRurcy, 24-57 (1992).
18 See 11 U.S.C. § 109 (1992); for an interesting discussion of some ways in which United States
bankruptcy law could be amended to accomodate sovereign debtors, see, Brett H. Miller, Note,
Sovereign Bankruptcy: Examining the United States Bankruptcy System as a Forum for Sovereign
Debtors, 22 L. & PoL'Y INT'L Bus. 1, 107 (1991).
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Before outlining the argument presented below, it is worth stating
explicitly what is not argued. The sub-Saharan debt crisis results, in sig-
nificant part, from the predatory practices of, and extraordinarily poor
collective judgment exercised by, international lenders. The lenders' cul-
pability is an important part of the background against which the fair-
ness of any proposed solution should be considered. It is not argued
here, however, that the lenders' sharp practices and bad judgment consti-
tute a sufficiently strong independent basis for nullification of the debt, ab
initio. Thus, it is not argued here that the debts never arose, but rather
that they must be discharged in substantial measure.
The doctrines employed on behalf of this objective are highly discre-
tionary and necessarily fact-reliant to an unusual degree. Therefore, the
relevant facts are developed below in considerable detail. Part II pro-
vides background information on the third world debt crisis, generally.
Part III describes and critiques some of the many contemporary propos-
als for solution of the crisis. The specific focus on sub-Saharan Africa
begins in Part IV, which (in Section A) briefly sketches the region's his-
tory of exploitation and dependence. Section B of Part IV outlines the
evolution of sub-Saharan Africa's external debt, including the role of the
World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the developed coun-
try governments, then describes the relevant practices of the commercial
lenders.
The discussion of legal doctrine begins in Part V, which considers
but rejects some arguably relevant but problematic legal bases for adjust-
ing or discharging the debt, including foreign sovereign immunity, the
Act of State Doctrine and lender liability theories.
Part VI begins with a brief, general discussion of contractual excuse
doctrine. Unconscionablity, perhaps the most basic of excuse doctrines,
is considered in Section B, which also addresses the limits of the analogy
to private parties under United States law. Sections C and D of Part VI
focus, respectively, on the applicability of the doctrines of impracticabil-
ity and mutual mistake to the sub-Saharan debt crisis. Section E pro-
poses use of the doctrine of equitable adjustment as a specific device to
discharge a substantial portion of sub-Saharan Africa's external debt.
Part VII discusses implications of the approach proposed in Part VI.
Fundamentally, this article is divisible into two traditional hemi-
spheres: the facts and the law. 19 Its detailed development of the facts
19 The term "facts" is used here in its everyday - i.e., lay or non-legal - sense. Questions
regarding admissibility of evidence are beyond the scope of this article and, in any event, quite
premature vis-a-vis the process of reforming a policy consensus on the issue of sub-Saharan African
debt and the modest contribution the author hopes to make to that process.
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lays the essential foundation for application of the legal doctrines that
follow. As these doctrines are equitable in nature, the facts are, to an
even greater extent than is typical, the linchpin of the legal arguments.
Extensive development of the facts is also intended to frame the crisis in
its proper historical context, demonstrate the depth and origin of the cri-
sis and highlight its urgency.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE CURRENT THIRD WORLD DEBT CRISIS
Most analysts trace the current third world debt crisis20 primarily to
the oil crisis of the early 1970s. The steep rise in oil prices had the twin
effects of further impoverishing oil poor LDCs and flooding the interna-
tional financial system with excess oil profits in need of investment.
In the late 1960s, the economic expansion in major industrialized
countries created a demand for oil beyond the supply then provided by
the oil producing nations.2 1 The supply-demand imbalance was exploited
and exacerbated by the tightening of crude oil supplies on the part of the
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries ("OPEC") and multina-
tional oil companies.22 The 1973 Yom Kippur War and the United
States' inability to increase immediate production only worsened the sup-
ply-demand imbalance.23 Between 1971 and 1974, oil prices increased
five-fold. 24
By 1974, OPEC's annual revenues were estimated at $100 billion.2 5
Its members could not spend all their profits on imports and, therefore,
had to find investments.26 In response, the United States developed a pro-
gram by which foreign governments could purchase United States Gov-
ernment securities directly, by special procedures established outside the
regular financial markets.27 The plan did not eliminate the surplus, how-
ever, and petro dollars poured into a relatively unregulated London mar-
20 The term "third world" is relatively new, but international debt crises are not. The first such
crisis involving the U.S. and one or more LDCs began in September, 1873, after a dramatic crash of
the New York stock market, when "a succession of (mostly Latin American] states declared them-
selves bankrupt and suspended payments on their external debts." CARLOS MARICHAL, A CEN-
TURY OF DEBT CRISES IN LATIN AMERICA 99 (1989). See also, JOHN H. MAKIN, THE GLOBAL
DEBT CRISIS 11-53 (1984).
21 Levinson, supra note 2, at 490.
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Idi at 491; See also Hans H. Angermuller, Introduction, SOVEREIGN LENDING: MANAGING
LEGAL RISK vii-xii (Michael Gruson ed., 1984); and Marylin Post, Comment, The Debt-for-Nature
Swap: A Long-Tenn Investment for the Economic Stability of Less Developed Countries, 24 INT'L
LAW. 1071, 1072 (1990).
25 Levinson, supra note 2, at 491.
26 Id.
27 Id. at 492.
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ket where United States, Japanese and Western European banks took
deposits for investment. As world economic activity declined in 1973
and 1974, Western industrial countries adjusted their economies by
adopting severe deflationary policies."8 They did not borrow to expand
capacity, in part, because their capital demand had been satisfied by
OPEC investment.29 In contrast, the oil importing LDCs3 0 did not re-
spond to increased oil prices by reducing economic activity, but bor-
rowed from Western financial institutions to pay increasing oil prices, to
expand economic growth and, in some cases, to offset capital flight.31
The net effect was to make OPEC a major creditor of the United States
and Western multinational banks, which in turn loaned the money to
poor, often politically unstable LDCs. 32
In 1979, a second oil crisis was precipitated in part by the fall of the
Shah of Iran.33 Multinational oil companies had let reserves fall; their
rush to replace inventory caused oil prices to double in 1980. 3" LDCs
borrowed again, this time not only to pay the increased price of oil and to
fuel economic growth, but also to make payments on the loans taken
during the first round of radical oil price increases.35
Meanwhile, government attempts to expand the United States econ-
omy after the retrenchment of 1973-74 had resulted in double-digit infla-
tion and a rise in the prime rate.36 Federal Reserve Board Chairman
Paul Volker "slammed" monetary policy into reverse.37 The effects of
this slowdown were not limited to the domestic economy of the United
States. Because the economy of United States was the largest and most
influential in the world,38 as money tightened and import demand
dropped in the U.S., the same things happened throughout the world.39
28 Ia, at 493.
29 Id.
30 A few LDCs (e.g., Angola, Nigeria and Venezuela) are oil exporters. The great majority,
however, buy oil on the international market.
31 Levinson, supra note 2, at 491.
32 Id.
33 Id. at 495.
34 Id. at 495-6.
35 See Post, supra note 24, at 1072-73; and Levinson, supra note 2, at 496.
36 Levinson, supra note 2, at 496.
37 See Id. at 496, n. 34 (quoting W. Wriston in Was I exacting? Sure. Was I Occasionally Sarcas-
tic? of Course, INST. INVSTOR, June 1987, 17, 20, as stating "[w]hat nobody knew was that Volcker
was going to lock the wheels of the world. And when he threw the U.S. into the deepest recession
since 1933, it spread to the whole world. And that's what started, the ... international debt crisis:
Export ratios that looked very good the month before he took office looked like a disaster a year
later." Id. at 20).
38 Id.
39 Levinson, supra note 2, at 496-97.
264
Contractual Bases for Adjusting African Debt
13:258(1992)
Interest rates doubled when the major industrialized nations decided to
deal with inflation through strict monetary policies. These developments
affected third world debtors in two critical ways. First, a significant por-
tion of the loans carried floating interest rates, and these rates skyrock-
eted.' Second, because of tight money and weakened demand, third
world debtors had trouble selling their exports to raise revenue. In 1982,
Mexico made its historic declaration of inability to meet even the interest
payments on its external debts, and "third world debt crisis" was well on
its way to becoming a household phrase.41
III. CONTEMPORARY PROPOSALS FOR SOLUTION OF THE CRISIS
When Mexico defaulted on its loan payments in August 1982, the
financial community was shocked into confronting a problem which had
only been discussed previously in terms of conjecture.42 Commercial
banks abruptly reduced their lending to developing nations.43 It became
clear that the market system alone would not solve the debt crisis.' Pro-
posals for resolving the crisis have been many, varied and, thus far, un-
successful.4" Some of these efforts are briefly described below.
A. Rescheduling
The severity and intractability of the debt crisis prompted debtors,
creditors, and governments to look for solutions. One of the earliest and
least innovative approaches is rescheduling - i.e., the extension of ma-
turity and a temporary reduction in payment amount. Rescheduling is a
fairly traditional means of giving a distressed debtor some "breathing
room."46 The rescheduling arrangement may also include a grace
40 Garg, supra note 4, at 47.
41 Levinson, supra note 2, at 497; see also Angermueller, supra note 31.
42 See generally, GEORGE ANN POTrER, DIALOGUE ON DEBT: ALTERNATIVE ANALYSES AND
SOLUTIONs (1988).
43 Id.
44 Levinson, supra note 2, at 503.
45 See generally, RUDIGER DORNBUSCH, DOLLARS, DEBTS AND DEFcrrs, 88-165 (1986).
46 According to a former member of the Federal Reserve Board:
It has been said that lending to countries is less risky than lending to businesses or individuals
because a country, unlike a business or an individual, will always be around. Country lending,
it is sometimes said, is free of final bankruptcy and definitive loss. All that is needed is occa-
sional rescheduling that gives the lender a breathing space and does not significantly affect the
earnings or capital of the lending banks.
Dr. Henry Wallich, Remarks at the International Conference of Banking Supervisors (Sept. 24,
198 l)(available at Federal Reserve Bank of New York), quoted in Ralph Reisner, Default by Foreign
Sovereign Debtors" An Introductory Perspective, 1982 U. ILL. L. REv. 1, 5 (1982); see generally,
Joseph J. Norton, ed., Prospects for International Lending and Reschedulings, (Southern Methodist
Unitversity Institute on International Finance, 1988).
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period.
In general, both debtors and creditors describe debt rescheduling as
a temporary "remedial measure designed to reestablish more normal fi-
nancial conditions."'4 7 Its long term utility is dependent, therefore, on
the debtor countries' ability to establish such "normal financial condi-
tions." A senior economist for the World Bank explains, however, that
"[r]escheduling takes debt that is not being serviced and makes a new
loan out of it at higher interest rates. Therefore, rescheduling has not
eased the debt burden."'
48
Some commentators are decidedly pessimistic about the long term
viability of rescheduling:
[S]ince 1982, no country involved in rescheduling its debts has significantly
reduced its debt ratio. The experiences of the sub-Saharan African coun-
tries suggest that a cycle of rescheduling could persist indefinitely and that
rescheduling alone may not be adequate to restore borrowing capacity to
permit imports to levels consistent with modem growth.49
Two primary fora exist for the rescheduling of sovereign debt. The
Paris Club (established in 1956 to address Argentina's difficulties in serv-
icing its debts to several European countries)50 is open to all official (i.e.,
government and multilateral) creditors who wish to participate. It meets
at the request of individual debtor countries in response to specific re-
quests for relief. Debtor countries must meet two conditions to qualify
for Paris Club relief. "First, they must be in a situation of 'imminent
default.' Second, they must have negotiated [an economic reform] pro-
gram with the... [International Monetary Fund].... Official creditors
have always insisted that an IMF program be in place before commenc-
ing Paris Club negotiations.""1
Because debtor countries have begun relying on commercial credi-
tors as well as official lenders, it was perhaps inevitable that a parallel
framework for restructuring commercial debts would also developed. It
47 RIAD AJAMI & DARA KHAMBATA, INTERNATIONAL DEBT AND LENDING: STRUCTURE
AND POLICY RESPONSES 46 (1986). Use of the word "reestablish" is problematic. It is argued
below (Part VI, Section D) that it should have been clear from conditions existing at the time of
many loans to LDCs that repayment would be extremely difficult, if not impossible. In other words,
in many LDCs "normal financial conditions" (as lenders use the term) never existed and cannot,
therefore, be "reestablished."
48 Chandra Hardy, The African Countries" Implications of the Debt Crisis, 30 How. L.J. 469, 470
(1987).
49 Annan Amegbe, Debt Relief and Growth Prospects in Sub-Saharan Africa, Journal of Social,
Political and Economic Studies, 229; Ramesh C. Garg, Exploring Solutions to the LDC Debt Crisis,
BANKERS MAG., Jan.- Feb. 1989, at 46.
50 BRIAN KETTELL & GEORGE MAGNUS, THE INTERNATIONAL DEBT GAME, 148 (1986).
51 Karen Hudes, Coordination of Paris and London Club Reschedulings, 17 N.Y.U.J. INT. L. &
POL. 553, 556 (1985).
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is called the "London Club," reflecting the location of many of its meet-
ings; although it lacks the formal structure of the Paris Club, it uses simi-
lar procedures and imposes similar conditions for relief.52 London Club
reschedulings have typically required a commitment that the debtor
country will bring all past-due interest payments current by a specified
date and remain current thereafter. New money may be advanced to pay
interest on existing loans. 53
Unfortunately, rescheduling - whether via the Paris Club or the
London Club - does not offer a permanent solution to the crisis. There
is a cost to the debtor under the traditional rescheduling arrangement
because interest continues to accrue on any deferred amounts, and the
debtor must pay interest on the entire balance until the loan is paid in
full.54 "All that.., debt reschedulings are accomplishing are the post-
ponements of the debt-service peaks accompanied by a steady increase in
the burden of debt." 55
While it has been argued that banks, too, may have reason to disfa-
vor rescheduling arrangements, 56 Professor Andreas Lowenfeld suggests
otherwise. He asserts that commercial banks have specific incentives to
reschedule - regardless of the debtors' circumstances:
Assets of a bank basically consist of outstanding loans, and they remain on
the [bank's financial s]tatement as assets so long as they are not in default.
If a $1,000 loan carries ten percent annual interest, payable quarterly, it
brings in $25 every three months; if the interest is not paid, say for two
quarters it is considered a non performing loan and must be written down
by 50% on the Statement of Condition; if non payment of interest continues
further, the loan may have to be written off entirely. Thus, for $25 or $50
in additional funds used to keep interest payments current, a bank saves
itself from a write-down of $500 of a write off of $1000, a reduction in the
asset side of the balance sheet that must be matched (once loan reserves are
exhausted) by a corresponding reduction in earnings and (if those are insuf-
ficient) in net worth.5
52 International Debt Restructuring, supra note 21, at 18.
53 Hudes, supra note 51, at 561.
54 KETrELL & MAGNUS, supra note 50, at 146.
55 Id. at 157.
56 Economists Brian Kettell and George Magnus have noted:
Rescheduling disrupts the flow of funds into and out of the balance sheet and restricts the
bank's ability to make loans on the basis of profitability and risk. The cost of management,...
and the reserves held against bad loans or dubious loans disrupt the income statement. All
these costs constitute direct and opportunity costs. Finally, adverse publicity regarding bad
loans or exposure to major problem debtors affects the banks's share price, its funding capacity
and its overall lending ability. Only time - and good fortune - will show whether the interest
and fee earnings from rescheduling will compensate for the costs and repercussions associated
with it. KETrEL & MAGNUS, supra note 50, at 158.
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Professor Cynthia Lichtenstein suggests that this need to reschedule
to maintain the appearance - or perhaps merely the fiction - of stabil-
ity went beyond the participating banks, and even beyond the banking
industry, to the entire international financial system:
even the House of Representatives recognized the necessity for the moment,
of rolling over the loans and allowing the rescheduling process to continue
with the addition of new money to keep the interest payments on the old
loans current, or at least current enough to prevent a mandatory recogni-
tion of default and a conceivable international financial breakdown.58
In summary, debt rescheduling is, at best, a "short-term solution to
a long-run problem"5 9 and will not suffice as a permanent approach.
More importantly for purposes of considering the fairness of the contrac-
tual solution proposed in Part VI below, rescheduling has provided two
specific benefits to the banks: (1) it commits the debtors to ever-increas-
ing payment obligations with no end in sight and (2) it allows the lending
banks to show an ever-improving (although likely false) picture through
their financial statements.
B. The Baker Plan
At the annual meeting of the World Bank and the IMF in Seoul,
South Korea, on October 9, 1985, United States Secretary of the Treas-
ury James A. Baker III announced a plan designed to solve the LDC
debt problem." Hailed as "a small step for one man... [but] a giant
leap for mankind,"61 the plan was welcomed, albeit tentatively, as a first
step toward resolving a seemingly intractable problem. 2
The Baker Plan, as it became known, recognized that the debt crisis
was not a short term disruption of economic order but a permanent con-
dition.63 Secretary Baker called for increased lending by commercial
banks located in the money centers of the developed countries and by the
58 Cynthia Lichtenstein, US Response to the International Debt Crisis: The International Lending
Supervision Act of 1983 and the Regulations Issued Under the Act, A DANCE ALONG THE PRECI-
PICE, 198 (William Eskridge Jr., ed., 1985).
59 Garg, supra note 4, at 46-47.
60 Statement by the Honorable James A. Baker, III, Secretary of the Treasury of the United
States, before the Joint Annual Meeting of the IMF and World Bank, Oct. 8, 1985, Seol, South
Korea, reprinted in U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY, TREASURY NEWS, 4-5 (Oct. 8, 1985).
61 Welcome Plan on Debt, FIN. TIMEs (LONDON), Oct. 9, 1985, at 1 16.
62 Robert D. Hormats, The World Economy Under Stress, 64 FOREIGN ArE. 455, 474 (1986).
The Baker Plan "urged debtor countries not only to implement sound fiscal and monetary policies,
but also to strengthen their private sectors, mobilize more domestic savings, facilitate investment,
liberalize trade and pursue market-oriented approaches to currencies, interest rates and prices." Id
63 Christine A. Bogdanowicz-Bindert, World Debt: the United States Reconsiders, 64 FOREIGN
AFF., 259, 268 (1985).
268
Contractual Bases for Adjusting Afican Debt
13:258(1992)
World Bank and various regional development banks.64 Secretary Baker
also asked the World Bank to seek greater efficiencies in its procedures in
order to reduce the time required to process loans and speed funds to
needy countries.
The second aspect of the Baker Plan made renewed lending by the
commercial banks conditional on debtor nations' submission to IMF
scrutiny of their economic policies.6" The reforms required by the Baker
Plan involved reduction of government involvement in the economy, tax
reform to enhance entrepreneurial incentive, liberalization of trade barri-
ers, market-oriented exchange rates, devaluation of currency and a move
away from deficit financing.66
The financial community did not accept the Baker Plan enthusiasti-
cally. The first criticism was that the economic structure of the proposed
lending package was unrealistic. The plan called for the renewed lending
to grow 2.5 percent annually.6 7 In order to ease the debt servicing crisis,
however, the debtor countries' economies would also be required to grow
at an annual rate of six to seven percent.68 To meet this robust growth
expectation, the debtor nations would first have to reverse their economic
contraction and decline. Thus, in reality, these models were asking the
developing nations to grow, initially, by more than seven percent.69 If
this was possible, the crisis would not exist in its current proportions.
At least one commentator has asserted that the Baker Plan was
partly motivated by "the backlash building in the United States against
the 1982-85 strategy and the fear that in the debtor countries, the moder-
ates who wanted to work within the system were in danger of being over-
run by more radical forces, who wanted a break with the existing
international order."'7 Jerome I. Levinson, former General Counsel of
the Inter-American Development Bank, describes the Baker Plan as "a
rather eclectic attempt to synthesize the development experience of the
64 The Inter-American Development Bank ("IDB"), the Asian Development Bank, and the Af-
rican Development Bank. (Baker called for internal reorganization of the IDB in order to partici-
pate in the program.) Levinson, supra note 2, at 510.
65 Id.
66 Levinson, supra note 2, at 510 n. 96.
67 Levinson, supra note 2, at 16.
68 Id at 5, citing H. Rowen, Third World Debt has Nations Looking for Creative Answers, WASH.
POST, Mar. 20, 1988, at H41.
69 See Levinson, supra note 2, at 511 ("During 1985-87, the seventeen most highly indebted
countries that were to be the primary beneficiaries of the Baker Plan paid $74 billion more than they
received from private commercial banks and multinational lending institutions.").
70 Levinson, supra note 2, at 511 (citing Robin Broad, How About a Real Solution to Third
World Debt? N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 1987, at A25).
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past three decades."7 1 Citing the Baker plan's focus on structural reform
designed to elicit debtor countries' commitment to substitute market
forces and private enterprise for reliance on the public sector for eco-
nomic and social development, 72 Levinson states:
Above all, by tying the debtor country's access to capital for development
purposes to fidelity to a single economic development model that enhanced
the role of market forces and private enterprise, Secretary Baker created the
impression that what he sought was a return to the conditions that had
prevailed three decades earlier in the 1950s when access to capital for devel-
opment purposes depended upon adherence to IMF and World Bank
guidelines.7 3
C. Congressional Proposals
By the middle of 1986, the Baker Plan began to draw heated criti-
cism. Senator Bill Bradley recognized that the current debt burdens of
developing nations were so onerous that sustained economic growth
could not be expected without debt reduction.74 According to Bradley,
this reduction would require that Western bankers face up to their lend-
ing errors and recognize loan losses on their sovereign lending portfo-
lios. 75 Although this aspect of Senator Bradley's proposal sounded
radical to the financial world, in fact the write-offs were to be contingent
on economic reform, which had been central to the Baker Plan. Thus, in
order to qualify for reduction in its outstanding obligations to Western
bankers by ten percent over three years and three points off the interest
rates, 76 each troubled developing nation seeking such assistance would
have to agree to economic reform overseen by the IMF and World
Bank.7 7 Additionally, Bradley called for eased trade restrictions and flex-
ibility conducive to case-by-case solutions. 78
Other members of Congress have come forward with proposals of
their own. The most comprehensive, innovative initiative called for the
creation of an international debt adjustment facility.79 The function of
the institution would be to:
(a) purchase sovereign loans at discount, passing along the benefits of such
71 Levinson, supra note 2, at 515.
72 Id. at 511.
73 Id., at 515.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Mark Sullivan, Treasury's David Mulford Blasts Bradley Third World Debt Plan, AM.
BANKER, July 31, 1986, at 2.
77 Levinson, supra note 2, at 515.
78 Id.
79 Congressmen John J. LaFalce and Bruce A. Morrison made this proposal as part of the Om-
nibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1987. Id at 518.
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discount to the corresponding debt or country, (b) encourage developed
countries with capital surpluses to invest these in debtor countries, and (c)
assist creditor banks in voluntarily disposing of sovereign loans in the pri-
vate sector.80Congress even went so far as to authorize research into the
possibility of forming such an entity."1
However, Congress placed strict feasibility requirements on the es-
tablishment of proposed agency by the Treasury Department. If the crea-
tion of such an agency would result in a material increase in the discount
at which sovereign debt would be sold, materially increase the
probability of default of debtor nations or materially increase the likeli-
hood of disruption of debt service by debtor nations, 2 then the Treasury
could refuse to enter into negotiations with other developed countries to
create the proposed agency. 3 Adding to the start-up difficulties imposed
by the feasibility report, Congress prohibited any United States Govern-
ment financial backing for the agency.84 It was not clear, therefore, from
where the debt relief would come.
D. The Brady Plan
It is generally conceded that the Baker Plan did little to solve the
debt problem facing both the debtor nations and the creditor banks. On
March 10, 1989, less than four years after the Baker Plan was first pro-
posed, then United States Treasury Secretary Nicolas F. Brady endorsed
a supposedly new strategy.85 The central point of Brady's "plan" was
simply that "the path toward greater credit worthiness and a return to
the markets for many debtor countries needs to involve debt
reduction." 6
Brady proposed that the IMF and the Bank provide funding for
these reductions by such efforts as debt buy backs and conversion to mar-
ketable securities. Debtor countries would be required, as a condition of
receiving loans, to commit to measures that would encourage the flow of
new commercial finance. In other words, more IMF or IMF-like
conditions.
80 Id. The key word is "encourage," because all the institution has to do is encourage countries
with capital surpluses to invest in the developing countries. In order for investors to put money into
developing countries, they must get higher returns than they could elsewhere in the world. Add to
this the inherent economic risk of investing in developing countries, and one would expect that an
investor would require substantially higher rates of return than from investments elsewhere.
81 See 22 U.S.C. § 5331 (1990).
82 Levinson, supra note 2, at 519 (quoting Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988,
Pub. L. No. 100-418 § 3111 (a)(2)(A)-(C), 102 Stat. 1107, 1376 (to be codified as 22 U.S.C. § 5331)).
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Id. at 535.
86 Id.
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However, like Baker's recognition in 1985 that developing countries
needed new credits to keep their economies from severe depression,
Brady's recognition that debt reduction is necessary does no more than
state the obvious. Each so-called "plan" is alarmingly short on detail.
The banks are unwilling to take severe "hits" to their bottom lines, when
they are scrambling to meet the new capital ratios required through in-
ternational agreement. Brady's so-called plan is no more than a Baker
Plan rehash with a recognition that some LDC debt will have to be dis-
charged, not just rescheduled. It has been suggested that the Brady Plan
was actually intended only for Mexico.8 7
E. Debt-for-Equity Plans
The magnitude of the debt crisis and its resistance to attack have
fostered the growth of a secondary market for the debt of developing
countries.88 Creditors have realized that selling a debt, even at a deep
discount, is preferable to reflecting a huge loss on the loan portfolio. One
of the two dominant forms of debt conversion in the secondary market is
the debt-for-equity swap. Under this scheme, some or all of a nation's
debt is exchanged for a local currency equity investment in a local
company. 89
In a debt-for-equity swap, an investor approaches a large debtor na-
tion and expresses an interest in investing in an industry or specific busi-
ness. The investor proposes to buy outstanding debt from a specific
creditor or on the open market for a fraction of the face amount of the
outstanding loan. The investor then sells the outstanding loan to the
debtor nation for the face amount or for a discounted amount of local
currency. The terms of exchange are negotiable. The investor then uses
the sale proceeds to buy an equity stake in the local business, and makes
further capital investment. Ideally, this process reduces the debtor's out-
standing debt, attracts new funds into the local economy and gives the
investor control over his investment.
However, from the perspective of the debtor nation, debt-for-equity
87 Mexican President on Dealing with World Debt, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Feb. 5, 1990, at 4.
88 See generally, Eve Burton, Debt for Development: A New Opportunity for Nonprofits, Commer-
cial Banks, and Developing States, 31 HARV. INT'L L.J. 233 (1990).
89 Derek Asiedu-Akrofi, A Comparative Analysis of Debt Equity Swap Programs in Five Major
Debtor Countries, 12 HASTrNGS INT'L & CoMp. L. REv., 537, 538 (1989). See generally, U.N. Cen-
tre on Transnat'l Corp. Debt Equity Conversions" A Guide for Decision-Makers, U.N. Doe. St/ctc/
104, U.N. Sales No. E.90.II.A.22 (1990); Keith Stanton Richey, Privatization and Debt-for-Equity
Swaps from a U.S. Bank's Perspective, 17 INT'L TAX J., no. 3, 70 (1991); Stuart M. Berkson & Bruce
A. Cohen, Tax Implications of Debt-for-Equity Swaps, 12 HASTINGS INT'L & CoMP. L. REV. 575
(1989).
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swaps can have certain drawbacks that make them inadequate as a pri-
mary debt reduction device. In order to make the exchange between the
hard-currency denominal value (usually dollars) of the debt and the local
debt, the debtor government must print money or issue bonds. Both of
these practices can be inflationary, and thus, if the debtor is under a strict
austerity program, may violate the terms of its agreement that allowed
external borrowing to resume. Additionally, as one Brazilian official ob-
served of issuing bonds to raise local currency to make the exchange:
"what we're doing is swapping long term foreign debt.., for short-term
domestic debt.... ."9 If there is further hardship, the government may
even be forced to cut social spending in order to meet local bond pay-
ments. The debt-for-equity swap idea has been positively received, but it
is simply unrealistic to expect that it will solve the debt crisis.91
Nationalism is a second fundamental impediment that wholesale
debt-for-equity swapping would confront. Most sub-Saharan countries
achieved their independence fairly recently. Memories of colonialism not
only linger, but result in strong opposition to the idea of selling to the
West anything that might be perceived as reducing autonomy. Further-
more, debt-for-equity swaps could have very limited applicability in
countries where only one or two nationalized industries dominate the
economy. There is also the problem of how swaps fit into the unbalanced
developing economy. Because only relatively well developed industries
would attract significant interest, the resultant investment is likely to ex-
aggerate existing imbalance, rather than broadening the productive base
of the economy. 92
90 Burton, supra note 88, at 237.
91 Levinson, supra note 2, at 525.
92 Debt-for-equity swaps are subject to regulation by the Unites States government. Regulation
K (12 C.F.R. para. 211) was promulgated by the Federal Reserve Board to implement the exemp-
tions in Section 4(c) of the Bank Holding Company Act (12 U.S.C. para. 1843(c)) which provide
certain exemptions to the BHCA's prohibition against non-banking activities and investment in enti-
ties other than banks. The Board's 1987 amendments to Regulation K expanded the scope of au-
thorized investments to permit a bank holding company to hold equity positions of up to 100% in
non-financial (e.g., commercial or industrial) companies located in "eligible countries." However,
the shares must be acquired from the government or a governmental agency; in other words, the
acquired company "must be a public sector company in the process of being transferred from public
to private ownership." Regulation K defines an eligible country as one that, since 1980, has restruc-
tured its national debt held by foreign creditor; the definition also includes any other country the
Board determines is eligible. The 33 most heavily-indebted nations are considered eligible countries
under Regulation K. Asiedu-Akrofi, supra note 89, at 566; Michael Gruson, Investment in Foreign
Equity Securities and Debt-for-Equity Conversion by U.S. Banks, Bank Holding Companies, and For-
eign Bank Holding Companies, 1988 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 441, 443; See also, Scott A. Shane, U.S.
Policy Toward Debt Equity Swaps, 16 . Soc. POL. & ECON. STUD. 287 (1991).
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F. Debt-For-Nature/Debt-For-Development Plans
Two hybrid forms of the debt-for-equity device are debt-for-nature
and debt-for-development plans. A debt-for-nature swap generally in-
volves the permanent or temporary forgiveness of a nation's debt in ex-
change for the nation's agreement to certain environmental
commitments. For example, in a typical debt-for-nature arrangement, a
group-normally a conservationist organization-will buy outstanding
debt either directly from the lender or on the secondary market and ex-
change it for control of some part of the debtor's environment. 9 The
primary focus of the movement thus far has been on saving tropical rain
forests. This approach reflects the essential ecological role of the rain-
forests and the disproportionate representation of countries with signifi-
cant remaining rain forests among the nations burdened with excessive
debts.
The first such swap was completed in 1987 by Conservation Interna-
tional, which purchased roughly $650,000 worth of outstanding Bolivian
debt for $100,000 and exchanged it for major environmental control of
nearly four million acres of Bolivian rain forest. 94 More recently, a tri-
party arrangement was established among the government of the Philip-
pines, the World Wildlife Fund and the Haribon Foundation. Under this
swap, the Wildlife Fund is to acquire up to $2 million of debt owed to
American banks; this debt is then exchanged for local currency at par.
The local currency is in turn used by the Haribon Foundation to provide
funding for the environmental activities of the Philippine Department of
Environmental Natural Resources.
Debt-for-nature swaps have several benefits. The swap enables the
debtor country to repay the debt in its own, readily-available currency,
rather than less accessible foreign currency.95 Also, "Debtor countries
may be able to capture discounts on debts sold on the secondary market
and convert such debts into conservation-related investments." 96 Credi-
tors are able to rid their portfolios of loans with a high probability of
default and non-performance; this elimination of the debt is vastly prefer-
93 See Marilyn Post, The Debt-for-Nature Swap: A Long-Term Investment for the Economic Sta-
bility of Less Developed Countries, 24 INT'L LAW. 1071, (1990); J. Eugene Gibson and Randall K.
Curtis, A Debt-for-Nature Blueprint, 28 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 331 (1990); David Bigman, A
Plan to End LDC Debt and Save the Environment Too, 33 CHALLENGE 33 (1990).
94 Post, supra note 93, at 1081-1082.
95 Gibson & Curtis, supra note 93, at 336.
96 Asiedu-Akrofi, supra note 89, at 577. Also see generally, J. Eugene Gibson and William J.
Schrenk, The Enterprise for the Americas Initiative: A Second Generation of Debt for Nature Ex-
changes - With an Overview of Other Recent Exchange Initiatives, 25 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. &
ECON. 1 (1991).
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able to continual adjustment and rescheduling of the debts, which are
often accompanied by further advances to a debtor already in trouble.
The conservation organization receives income from payments on the
debt and is able to exert influence to further its environmental goals. Fi-
nally, the increased awareness of the need to protect and conserve envi-
ronmental resources is beneficial to all.
However, debt-for-nature swaps raise serious concerns for debtor
countries. Paramount among these is national sovereignty. 97 The pros-
pect of foreign ownership and/or control of national resources and domi-
nation of the economy can be offensive and threatening to developing
countries. 98 Criticism has been raised about the potential inflationary
impact of swaps on the economy.9 9 This concern is primarily because the
country must print large amounts of new currency, issue unbacked bonds
or divert circulating currency from other purposes in order to carry out
the swap."° In addition, swaps necessarily can address only a small por-
tion of the world's debt, and enforcement mechanisms may be inadequate
or unavailable.
Debt-for-development is an idea posited by Eve Burton.101 She ar-
gues that development agencies can use their allocated budgets for spe-
cific program countries to buy outstanding debt on the open market and
then exchange it for its local currency equivalent. These funds are then
invested in local development programs. Again, like debt-for-equity, this
program is inflationary, but it does avoid nationalism problems.
G. Some Smaller Experiments
1. Securitization of Debt
The development of a secondary market for third world debt in the
financial and business communities and the creation of debt conversion
schemes such as debt-for-nature and debt-for-equity swaps have paved
the way for consideration of "securitization" as a possible solution to the
problem of third world debt.102
Securitization of third world debt operates in much the same man-
ner as the more familiar mortgage-backed and asset-backed securities
97 See Priya Alagiri, Give Us Sovereignty or Give Us DebL Debtor Countries's Perspective on Debt
for Nature Swaps, 41 AM. U. L. REv. 485 (1992); Gibson & Curtis, supra note 93, at 343.
98 1,L
99 Alan Patterson, Debt for Nature Swaps and the Need for Alternatives, 10 ENVIRONMENT 4
(Dec. 1990).
100 Id.
101 Burton, supra note 88, at 243.
102 Alfred J. Puchala, Jr., Securitizing Third World Debt, 1989 COLUM. Bus. L. REv., 137, 138
(1989).
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transactions. Loans selected in accordance with rigorous underwriting
criteria are pooled and sold to an independent entity, often a trust or a
special purpose corporation established by the selling creditor. The in-
come resulting from loan payments is used to make regular payments of
interest to the security holders.10 3
Proponents of securitization as part of the solution to the debt crisis
point to several benefits to all parties. Debtors could benefit from a
structure permitting a hiatus in interest payments. Debtor nations could
also gain by purchasing the securities and thereby realizing a portion of
the market discount."° Creditor banks would relieve their portfolios of
high risk loans, which could be replaced with better quality assets.
However, at least one commentator has questioned whether the
securitization proposal truly addresses the needs of debtor countries. 105
In light of the impossibility of debt service for many developing coun-
tries, it is said that securitization addresses only the creditors' needs and
is "a little like talking about what color to paint a house that has been
condemned as structurally unsound."' 0 6 The question is raised whether
securitization renders the debts any less risky, and the point is made that
the essential first step is to forgive or reduce part of the debt."17 Unless
steps are taken to resolve the "underlying problem of the crushing debt
burdens,"'' 0 other efforts are almost certain to be ineffective.
2 The Miyazawa Plan
Japanese Finance Minister Miyazawa has proposed a plan that
utilizes the securitization concept with a twist. Debtors would "guaran-
tee" their debt service by granting liens on their exchange reserves and
on the proceeds of sale of government-owned assets. The portion of the
debt that is not contributed to the securitized pool is then adjusted; grace
periods of up to five years are granted, during which interest payments
may be reduced, suspended or canceled altogether. The last element of
the plan is increased lending by multilateral and bilateral agencies to
countries that have taken the first two steps. 109
103 Id.
104 Id. at 152-53.
105 David W. Leebron, First Things First: A Comment on Securitizing Third World Debt, 1989
COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 173 (1989).
106 Id. at 174.
107 Id. at 175-6.
108 Id. at 182.
109 Approaches to Debt Reduction, FINANCE AND DEVELOPMENT, Sep., 1989, at 16.
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3. The Mitterand Proposal
French President Francois Mitterand suggests creation of a fund in
the IMF for middle-income debtor nations to guarantee interest pay-
ments on commercial loans converted to bonds. The guarantee would
result in substantially lower finance charges to the debtors and would be
financed by the developed countries' agreement to, in effect, donate their
share of a new issue of Special Drawing Rights for the developing coun-
tries' use. 110
4. The Robinson Plan
American Express Chairman James Robinson has proposed a plan
that calls for creation of an International Institution for Debt and Devel-
opment, which would purchase developing countries' debt at a significant
discount in exchange for its own high quality obligations. The purchased
debt would be subordinated to all new debt in an effort to encourage the
flow of new capital to the debtor countries. The Institution is conceived
as a joint venture between the IMF and the Bank and would condition its
purchases on the debtor countries' agreement to satisfactory economic
policies.I 1
None of the proposed solutions discussed above show any real
promise as a means of resolving the LDC debt crisis - either alone or in
combination with others112 - because total LDC debt, now exceeding $1
trillion, is simply too massive.' 13 What is needed is a much heightened
and comprehensive effort based on a new consensus about the nature and
origins of the problem. The legal doctrines discussed below can provide
the framework for such a consensus and, it is hoped, strengthen the re-
solve of policy makers by correcting the misperception that debt relief is
essentially a favor to the debtors. The specific factual backdrop against
which the legal principles must be considered is the history of sub-
Saharan Africa.
110 Id.
111 Leebron, supra note 105, at 181 n.27 ("First things first . .
112 The Institute for African Alternatives concluded that conventional policy proposals "would
give some temporary relief to African and other poor countries. But they cannot provide long-term
solutions to the structural problems of these countries. This is because they fail to address the
underlying causes of these problems - they deal mainly with their symptoms." Onimode, supra
note 17 at 195. "Much too often, bankers, economists and policymakers forget that the debt crisis
has emerged over a long period of time and therefore that short-term or patchwork solutions will be
largely unsuccessful in curing the underlying problem." Garg, supra note 4, at 47. See also, Makin,
supra note 27 at 224-245.
113 Paul Krugman, Debt Relief is Cheap, 80 FoR. PoL'Y 141, 143 (1990).
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IV. SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: THE FACTS
A. A Brief Historical Sketch
The pre-colonial economy of sub-Saharan Africa comprised rela-
tively self-sufficient agricultural and pastoral communities that produced
surplus food for inter-regional commerce.114 Small peasant proprietor-
ships formed the basic economic units, and property distribution was es-
sentially egalitarian.115 Political and social organizations were based on
kinship and developed into fairly complex units that carried out bureau-
cratic functions, defense and extensive trade that crossed the Sahara,
reaching as far as Cairo and the Mediterranean.1 16 From the east coast,
starting in about 1200 A.D., Indian Ocean trade routes carried African
goods as far as Canton, China.'17 Pre-colonial African society produced
sophisticated art, crafts and artifacts that evidenced a stable social order
and reflected sophisticated cultural and religious values.118
Tropical diseases and natural environmental hazards such as flood,
fire, pests and parasites kept an ecological balance between population
and environment. 119 Because land was plentiful and the climate warm,
there was little pressure toward innovative technological advances. 20 In
addition, the terrain encouraged isolation. Apart from natural sources of
transit such as rivers and lakes, "poor technology... made it difficult to
construct the necessary transport and communication network through
thick forest and swamp terrain to bring various communities together
114 ABOYADE supra note 7, at 2; see also Davidson, Africa in Historical Perspective, AFRICA
SOUTH OF SAHARA 4-10 (1989). "Sub-Saharan Africa" means Africa south of the Sahara desert, but
excludes the Republic of South Africa.
115 ABOYADE, supra note 7, at 2; See Davidson, supra note 114, at 10. Africa's pre-colonial socie-
ties were stateless. Stability was based on a complex balance of intra-group interests and power. The
"ancestors" in a "more or less timeless past" created a tradition of a balance with nature in which
outside influences were evils associated with witchcraft. "[A] given way of life, having brought a
given community into existence and enabled it to survive and sufficiently to prosper, came to seem a
way of life sanctioned by divine power.. ." Id.
116 ABOYADE, supra note 7, at 2; see also, Davidson, supra note 114, at 6. African culture was
characterized by self-rule such as village governments, chiefdoms, kingships and occasionally large
powerful empires modified and influenced by ecology.
117 Davidson, supra note 114, at 6-8. Carthaginians and later the Romans traded African prod-
ucts from coastal trade or overland routes. "A Greek-Egyptian mariner's guide to the Red Sea and
the north-western Indian Ocean, written around 150 A.D., tells of a regular trade between Red Sea
ports and the coasts of what are now Somalia, Kenya, and Tanzania."
118 Id.
119 ABOYADE supra note 7, at 3.
120 Id See also Davidson, supra note 114, at 6 (explaining the sub-Saharan Africans in their early
development "had little incentive to invent new methods of production, transport or exchange" and
felt little need to depart from their hoe-cultivation, pastoralism, and metal-working, "until they
found themselves exposed to a world which had developed quite different systems and, with these, a
far greater technological power.").
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and foster still larger contiguous markets.""12 Finally, with little outside
competition, there was little economic incentive to exchange leisure for
work.122 European domination began in the 1440s with the Atlantic
slave trade, which did not end until the 1880s. 123 The slave trade pro-
foundly upset traditional African society. 124 Over 10 million Africans
were taken to America alone, and at least ten times as many died en
route. 125 Entire African societies were eliminated, and vital manpower
essential to the demographic balance was upset. Meanwhile, America
and Europe used African slaves to build and expand their infrastructure
and economies. 126
After the 1880s, colonialism emerged as the preferred system for
exploiting Africa. Colonialism imposed territorial boundaries that were
arbitrary at best, and often were designed to undermine the rights and
interests of Africans. 127 African nations lost their capacity to develop
independent, traditional African structures. During a period when Euro-
pean and American societies developed from a rural base to an urban,
industrial base, African economies stagnated.12
Eventually, the colonial powers' desire to further expand exports
from the colonies required basic changes in colonial socio-economic or-
ganization. 129 Because the transition, however, was unmanaged, move-
ment of African labor from agricultural uses to urban and industrial uses
resulted in serious socio-economic instability in the colonies. 130 The ru-
ral economy was substantially undermined, and the "modem" sector be-
came responsible for providing for the social and capital cost of
121 ABOYADE, supra note 7, at 3.
122 Id. at 4 (explaining that "[c]onsistent with the assumptions of rational behavior, further
growth of the communal economy must have to come from higher product prices, or sacrifice of
leisure or improved technology.")
123 See Davidson, supra note 114, at 10-11 (explaining that although the African slave trade
conducted from the East coast of Africa by Asian slavers began earlier and persisted longer, it was
de minimis in comparison to the Atlantic trade.)
124 Davidson, supra note 114, at 10.
125 The number who died en route is unknown but estimated in the hundreds of millions. Id.
126 Id.; see also ABOYADE, supra note 7, at 4-5.
127 D.K. FIELDHOUSE, BLACK AFRICA 1945-80: ECONOMIC DECOLONIZATION & ARRESTED
DEVELOPMENT 55 (1986).
128 Id. Even the introduction into African colonies of advances such as excavated seaports, rail-
roads, motor vehicles and deep mines, went unassimilated by Africans and their indigenous econo-
mies. Assimilation was precluded primarily by discriminatory colonial labor practices that excluded
African workers, often by using short-term migrant workers instead. Access to modem education
was limited to that provided by Christian missionaries. In general, Africans were kept on the periph-
ery. Id. See generally, T.R. DeGregori, Foreign Investment and Technological Diffusion: The Case
of British Colonial Africa, 2 J. ECON. ISSUES 403 (1968).
129 See generally, ABOYADE, supra note 7.
130 Id
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maintaining a large and relatively unskilled urban proletariat. This rapid
urbanization destroyed a considerable part of sub-Saharan Africa's ca-
pacity for subsistence production and economic self-sufficiency. 131 As a
result, sub-Saharan Africa became essentially a region of "enclave econo-
mies" under the control of the "metropolitan" countries. 132
Most important in terms of current debt problems, colonial struc-
tures "imposed, both by indirect price incentives and by direct fiscal and
physical coercion, a structure of production and specialization dictated
by demand patterns and strategic requirements which were external to
African economies and beyond their influence." 133 Thus, the colonial
powers gradually replaced exportation of Africans with exportation of
cocoa, coffee, groundnuts, timber and minerals. Introduction of technol-
ogy into Africa was directed towards high returns, rather than economic
and sociological development for Africans. 134 Although exports showed
growth, the industrialization of peasant agriculture was very slow,13 5 and
Africa had to import substantial quantities of basic foods such as rice,
wheat and maize.136
After World War II, the European colonial powers (sometimes
hereinafter the "metropolitan states"), facing their own economic crises
resulting from the war's devastation, saw intensified exploitation of their
colonies as an essential part of their strategy for economic recovery and
future development.' 37 The metropolitan states used their superior bar-
gaining power to make bulk purchases of commodities from the African
colonies at below market prices. They exported manufactured goods
only to colonies that could pay with hard currency. This allowed Britain
alone to extract more than 140 million pounds from its colonies between
1945 and 1951 at a cost of less than 40 million pounds. 138
By 1952, however, the post-war crisis had subsided, and capital i-
quidity and international trade increased. 139  The end of post-war
131 Id.
132 ABOYADE, supra note 7, at 5; but see Fieldhouse, supra note 139, at 5 (expressing suspicion of
this assumption as arguing from "ex post situations"). The colonial powers extracted irreplaceable
natural resources and distributed property and profits to a small, mainly European, elite. Aboyade,
supra note 7, at 5. Colonialism also marginalized the role of Africans and imposed unfamiliar ad-
ministrative bureaucracies upon indigenous societies. Id; see generally, FIELDHOUSE, supra note
139, at 55.
133 Aboyade, supra note 7, at 5. See generally, Fieldhouse, supra note 139, at 55-57.
134 De Gregori, supra note 128, at 415.
135 FIELDHOUSE, supra note 127, at 33.
136 Id. at 36.
137 Id. at 6, 12-13.
138 Id. at 6.
139 Id. at 7.
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shortages and resultant drop in commodity prices caused most African
colonies to run deficits due to drastic declines in their export income.
Thus, "it was no longer necessary or useful to keep political control over
African dependencies in order to harness them to the bogged-down impe-
rial economies."' 40 Colonial demand for capital was driving interest
rates up. 4' Private industry in the metropolitan states was fearful that
"imperial preference would enable newly industrializing colonies to com-
pete unfairly with British manufacturers."142  For the metropoles, the
colonies had gone from providing economic windfalls to being economic
burdens.
"The only way out of the self-created dilemma was to substitute
rapid political advance for rapid economic advance; to give independence
and then be free to restrict the flow of aid to manageable levels on the
reasonable ground that independent states did not have the same claims
as colonies."143 In addition, the cold war gave Britain political and stra-
tegic reasons to seek the goodwill of those who would inherit political
power in the colonies.'" However, "it was beyond the economic capac-
ity of either Britain or France, both seriously weakened by the war, to
transfer sufficient resources to the colonies to enable them to modernize
their economies quickly...,141
Between 1957 and 1965 virtually all African colonies, except those
of Portugal, gained independence.'" The pressing strategic and eco-
nomic needs for African colonies during and immediately after World
War II had eased. The cost of maintaining colonies had become too
great, and metropolitan taxpayers viewed the colonies as a burden."4 It
was believed that:
if the colonies were liberated quickly and good relations established with
the successor regimes, there would be little or no economic loss to the me-
tropoles. African markets would remain open, colonial exports would con-
tinue to flow to their traditional European terminals [and] . . . foreign,
particularly American, capital would flow into them and this would not
only reduce the strain on metropolitan investment funds but would increase
the consumer capacity of Black Africa. 148 Although there was fear that




143 Id. at 23.
144 Id at 8.
145 Id. at 23.
146 Id. at 5.
147 Id. at 231-34.
148 Id at 232.
149 Id. at 22, 58.
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it was believed that delegating political functions to colonial elites while
continuing aid would relieve hostilities and encourage democracy. 150
This rapid process of decolonization was unanticipated and unplan-
ned. The metropoles, in creating their colonies, had suppressed the iden-
tity of tribal nations. The colonial "governments" were little more than
administrative bureaucracies created within arbitrarily drawn territories
and built upon concepts of economic specialization established by the
metropoles.151 Sub-Saharan Africans had no experience with the frame-
work of European government within which they were expected to co-
exist with one another. 52 Neither official government bureaucracies nor
multinational corporations had integrated Africans into management of
colonial economies in preparation for independence.153 Thus, at the time
of independence, the nations of sub-Saharan Africa lacked
the human skills essential in any Wester-style economic system.... Their
infrastructures could not carry the weight of large-scale modern industry or
agriculture. Their welfare services were inadequate for an increasing ur-
banized society.... Manufacturing was a very small... part of the domes-
tic product and agriculture, by far the largest sector measured by output or
the numbers engaged in it, was still predominantly a easant activity and
was only partly integrated with the market economy.
In sum, the former colonies had been politically underdeveloped and
economically overexploited.1 55 Uneven economic development and their
relatively brief participation in the world economy put the emerging Af-
rican nations in an untenable position.156 The sudden and forced transi-
tion from colonial economies to independent, self-sustaining economies
failed.157 All these circumstances set the stage for sub-Saharan Africa's
plunge into the current debt crisis. 158
150 Id. at 8, 22-23.
151 Id. at 55.
152 Id. at 56.
153 Id. at 10.
154 Id. at 233.
155 See FIELDHOUSF, supra note 131, at 233; Aboyade, supra note 7, at 6-7.
156 See ABOYADE, supra note 7, at 6-7.
157 Id. Ironically, in many African countries, GDP per capita increased during the 1960s. See
generally, African Economic Indicators (UN Economic Commission for Africa) for the years 1968,
1972, 1973. This apparent economic expansion during the 1960s, however, resulted from the new
governments' imprudent efforts to gain short term advantage and was largely illusory. "What the
new independent governments added was a readiness to borrow far beyond what colonial govern-
ments had regarded as prudent, to extract a greater proportion of the domestic product for public
spending than had seemed politically safe before and to provide attractions to potential foreign and
indigenous investors which derived from nationalist rather than economic calculations."
FIELDHOUSE, supra note 127, at 42.
158 "The fact that power was transferred when African societies were still quite unprepared for
the difficulties ahead must be seen as a possible ... link between decolonization and later 'arrested
development.'" FIELDHOUSE, supra note 127, at 234.
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The process by which the debt evolved is also important to the ap-
plicability of the legal doctrines developed below. The history of this
evolution establishes that the loan transactions were anything but "arms
length."
B. Evolution of the Debt
Sub-Saharan Africa's external debt can be dissected in a number of
ways. One useful approach is to distinguish, initially, between official
debt and commercial debt, based on the type of lender. "Official" debts
include those owed to sovereign states or international financial institu-
tions such as the IMF and the World Bank. 159 "Commercial" debts, on
the other hand, are those owed to commercial banks or other private
lenders. 160
Unlike the debtor countries of Latin America, most sub-Saharan Af-
rican countries are indebted primarily to official creditors: Western gov-
ernments, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (the
"IMF").16' The World Bank and the IMF are the dominant players in
the debt crisis, 62 and critics contend that these institutions are subject to
extraordinary influence by the United States and that they cater to - or,
at least, champion the interests of - the commercial banks, which rely
heavily on World Bank/IMF "ratings" of LDCs as potential borrowers
and often require compliance with IMF or "IMF-like" conditions.163
The IMF, the World Bank and the commercial lenders have acted with
159 John Baloro, African Responses to the Debt Crisis: The Relevance of International Law, 23
COMP. & INT'L L.J. S. AFR. 139, 146 (1990).
160 Id. at 147. A third, less obvious category of debt includes loans from official or commercial
lenders to companies within a debtor country. These loans do not represent sovereign debt - pro-
vided the company is not an agency or instrumentality of the state - but are relevant to the debt
crisis because (1) in many instances, lenders require that these loans be guaranteed by the govern-
ment of the debtor company's country and (2) even where there is no guarantee, repayment of the
loan will generally require drawing on the foreign currency reserves of the debtor country.
161 Ebenroth, supra note 5, at 631; see also Yacob Haile-Mariam, Legal and Other Justifications
for Writing-off the Debts of the Poor Third World Countriev The Case of Africa South of the Sahara,
24 J. WORLD TRADE 57, 58 (1990) (explaining that only 15% of African external debt is owed to
private, commercial lenders because of the risks associated with lending to sub-Saharan countries).
162 Other relevant institutions include the United Nations Development Program (UNDP),
which provides 80% of its assistance to countries with annual per capita incomes less than $500. In
1981, sub-Saharan Africa received 30% of the UNDP's budget. The United Nations Industrial
Development Organization (UNIDO) is an executive agency of UNDP that generates industrializa-
tion policies, plans, surveys, feasibility studies, management strategies and marketing and research
studies for projects in LDCs. RONALD BENDRicK, 4 LEGAL ASPECTS OF DOING BUSINESS IN AF-
RICA 6, 9, 10 (Donald Campbell ed. 1986).
163 "... the Fund and the Bank have been dominated by the United States and a commitment to
multilateralism of free international flows of goods and capital that subordinate the interests of Afri-
can and Third World countries." Onimode, supra note 17, at 191.
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the approval of the governments of the developed countries. Thus, the
international lending system with which the LDCs deal is, as a practical
matter, one entity. This lack of meaningful alternatives for the LDCs is a
significant part of the background against which a solution of the crisis
should be considered.
1. The World Bank, the IMF and "Official" Lending
The IMF and the World Bank were established at the Bretton
Woods Conference 16 in July 1944. The United States, Britain and their
World War II allies intended that the World Bank (the "Bank") and the
IMF would be the central figures in the post-war economic order.1 65 The
role envisioned for the Bank was to promote development by financing
investment in countries in need after the war; the assigned role of the
IMF was "to maintain order in the international monetary system." 166
The World Bank - whose real name is the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development - was to focus on rebuilding Europe's
economies, but it was upstaged and rendered almost superfluous by the
Marshall Plan.167 The Bank then shifted its focus from reconstruction to
development and, in the 1950s, turned its attention to the third world. 6 8
The IMF, on the other hand, performed its role as originally envisioned
until the early 1970s, when changing circumstances forced it to assume
responsibilities more akin to those of the Bank. The IMF became a
lender after its original role:
was clouded by the breakdown of the system of fixed exchange rates that
the Bretton Woods Conference had designed. Floating currencies and the
expansion of private capital markets left the Bretton Woods code of eco-
nomic conduct, and hence the IMF's role, in doubt. Later, during the
1980's, both the Bank and the IMF struggled to cope with the new problem
of developing-country debt. Soon the demarcation of duties had become all
the more blurred, almost beyond recognition .... In one developing coun-
try after another, the two institutions devised overlapping programs of eco-
nomic reform and backed them with cash.169
164 The conference took place at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire.
165 MARGARET GARarISEN DE VRIES, THE IMF IN A CHANGING WORLD 1945-85 5-9 (1986).
166 Id. at 30.
167 Sisters in the Wood: Distant Relation, ECONOMIST, Oct. 12, 1991, at 9.
168 In the 1950s, the Bank's effort in the third world focused primarily upon development of
infrastructure (e.g., roads, bridges, power stations). In the 1960s, it began to support urban develop-
ment, farming, education and population control. Id. During his tenure as President of the Bank
from 1968 to 1981, Robert McNamara reaffirmed the Bank's commitment to the third world and
pledged to help the poorest of the LDCs. Id.
169 Sisters in the Wood: Two Pillars of Wisdom, ECONOMIST, Oct. 12, 1991, at 5 [hereinafter Two
Pillars of Wisdom]. "Before the current crisis, the Fund concentrated on short-run balance of pay-
ments adjustment, while the Bank engaged in longer-term project lending for agricultural develop-
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Under the Articles of Agreement of the World Bank, 170 membership in
the Fund is a prerequisite to participation in the Bank's programs. 171
At present, the World Bank supplies capital for development
projects that are open to international bidding,172 and provides advice in
conjunction with the IMF on economic and legal reforms directed to-
wards stimulating economic growth by creating "a more attractive in-
vestment climate."' 173
2. "Conditionality" and the Collapse of the Distinction Between
Official and Commercial Lending
"Conditionality" is the term used to describe the IMF's and the
Bank's requirements that a member country follow certain economic pol-
icies in order to be able to use the Fund's general resources. The condi-
tions generally include devaluations, budget cuts, subsidy withdrawals,
privatization of public enterprise and demand suppression through deval-
uation of local currency.174 The great majority of the IMF's lending is
subject to conditions. 75 Not surprisingly, such comprehensive and strict
austerity measures and forced reforms toward free market principles
have been historically unpopular in the debtor countries. 176 In the con-
ment and growth. But since the 1980s, both agencies have increasingly synthesized their activities
around a Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) or Economic Recovery Programme (ERP)."
ONIMODE, supra note 10, at 191.
170 The World Bank consists of three institutions: (1) the International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development ("IBRD") which makes loans to LDCs that are at an advanced developmental
stage for government or government-guaranteed projects; (2) the International Development Associ-
ation (IDA) which provides concessional credit primarily to poorer countries that allow for a ten
year grace period with a 50 year maturity and no interest; and (3) the International Finance Corpo-
ration (IFC) which generates domestic and foreign capital for the private sector. The IFC has au-
thority to make equity investments and loans to governments without government guarantees and to
raise finance by syndicating its own loans or by parallel financing from capital markets. It also
provides project sponsors with technical assistance. BENDRICK, supra note 162, at 7. The World
Bank's co-finance partners are (1) governments and multilateral financial institutions, (2) export
credit agencies that procure goods from specific countries and (3) commercial banks. Id. at 9.
171 "This suggests that the founders [of the Bank and the IMF] believed that [debtor] countries
should be prepared to accept the Fund's code of conduct as an assurance that the development
financing made available through the Bank would be properly used." Stephan A. Silard, Legal As-
pects of Development Financing in the 1980"" The Role of the International Monetary Fund, 32 AM.
U. L. REv. 89 (1982).
172 BENDRICK, supra note 162, at 6.
173 Id.
174 ONIMODE, supra note 10, at 191.
175 Richard Gerster, The IMF and Basic Needs Conditionality, 16 J. WORLD TRADE L. 497
(1982).
176 At one point, the Fund actually felt constrained to publish a defensive pamphlet entitled "Ten
Common Misconceptions About the IMF." The "misconceptions": (1) that the Bank and the Fund
apply identical remedies, irrespective of a country's circumstances; (2) the Fund supports programs
that do not work; (3) the Fund is anti-growth; (4) the Fund's conditions harm the poor; (5) the Fund
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text of the cold war, the IMF's conditions became a powerful instrument
of influence, if not coercion. 177
Meanwhile, an important change in borrowing patterns had already
begun in the 1970s, when sub-Saharan countries were driven to borrow
from more expensive private commercial sources to finance the deficit
where the IMF or bilateral borrowing left off.178 As sub-Saharan govern-
ments borrowed increasingly from private lenders, they subjected them-
selves to shorter maturities and higher (and/or floating) interest rates. 79
Yet they did not escape the IMF and its conditions. Increasingly, private
lenders rely on the Fund's assessments of prospective debtors. The avail-
ability of a private loan might even be expressly conditioned on the bor-
rower's status within the Fund. 180 University of Swaziland Professor
imposes austerity on member countries; (6) the Fund's priority is to bail out the commercial banks;
(7) the Fund has a market-oriented, free enterprise philosophy, which it imposes in a doctrinaire
way; (8) the Fund ignores the views of developing country governments; (9) the Fund has no influ-
ence over the governments of rich countries; and (10) the Bank and the Fund collude in dealing with
developing countries. Two Pillars of Wisdom, supra note 169, at 6.
177 One critical commentator ascribed six functions to these conditions:
1. As a key to IMF resources: From the members' point of view, conditionality is the key to
access to the Fund's resources.
2. As a seal of approval for the economic policy of a country and facilitate[or of]... access to
private and official loans.
3. As a vehicle to dependency: Through reintegration into the present world economy with
unequal partners, conditionality tends to keep the developing countries in dependency instead
of promoting their self reliant development.
4. To exclude alternative balance of payments policies: As conditionality of IMF credits is
designed to promote the purposes of the Fund, the concept of IMF conditionality excludes -
often undiscussed - alternative balance of payments policies.
5. As a rationing device: On its way to a more liberal system of international trade and pay-
ments, IMF conditionality facilitates rationing and allocation of scarce resources along the lines
of market forces, thereby replacing other social and political priorities.
6. To favor foreign interests: The chosen IMF-conform adjustment policies favor the interests
of foreign creditors and are therefore the key to the repayment of the Fund's own credits.
Gerster, supra note 175, at 499.
The economic failure and resultant world-wide political collapse of communism, however, have
severely undercut debtor country arguments that the IMF's heavy-handed push toward free market
principles meaningfully restricts the debtor countries' right to choose among credible alternative
development paradigms.
178 Although indebtedness to official creditors accounted for 70% of total external debt, there was
an increasing tendency not only for borrowing to increase at a faster rate in many African countries,
but also for private debt to accumulate at a higher rate than official debt. In the four-year period
1970-1974, private debt increased by 29.3% annually compared with 18.6% for bilateral official and
multilateral debt. This tendency has a serious implication for the nature of indebtedness. [need full
cite] ECA 1976 at 25-26; Garg, supra note 4, at 47. ECA 1976 at 8. Sub-Saharan African debtors
were not alone in this. "Since 1971, there has been a marked shift in the debt structure of the LDCs,
with private capital replacing official lending.... Lending from private sources historically has been
more costly to the borrower and characterized by shorter maturities." Garg, supra note 4, at 47.
179 Garg, supra note 4, at 47.
180 Sir J. Gold, Order in International Finance, the Promotion ofITMF Standby Arrangements, and
the Drafting of Private Loan Agreements, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND PAMPHLET No. 39 2
(1982).
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John Baloro states that, "In practice, the attitude of commercial banks
toward a particular African state... depends very much on whether or
not that country has agreed to implement an IMF adjustment
programme."181
3. The Role of the Developed Country Governments
The collapse of the distinction between official and commercial lend-
ing, and the subsequent explosive growth of further lending (usually in
the form of rescheduling, discussed above), occurred against the back-
drop of supportive government policy in the developed countries. A
British banker and former Cabinet Minister stated that:
We are not dealing with the isolated misjudgment of a few banks but with
the worldwide overcommitment of an interlocking banking system. More-
over, the banks did not act in isolation. Their decisions were approved and
encouraged by their governments ... governments and banks shared the
delusion that sovereign default was unthinkable and that the debtors would
be able to service their debt indefinitely by borrowing. 182
In 1983, the Banking Committee of the United States House of Rep-
resentatives reached the same conclusion:
In the last decade the U.S. Government, along with other western govern-
181 Baloro, supra note 159, at 146; but see, Andreas Lowenfeld, Political Economy for the 1980'v"
Global Banks and National Governments, 101 HAtv. L. REv. 1061, 1070 (1988)(book review) (sug-
gesting that - at least in Latin American lending - many commercial banks imposed no such
"IMF-like" conditions). "All that was needed (to exaggerate slightly) was a commitment to 'mar-
ket' interest rates, typically a floating rate .... Id. On the other hand, it was reported that "as
Brazil struggled under the burden of its external debt and as social unrest threatened to cause serious
political trouble for the government of President Figueiredo, Brazil's bank creditors indicated that
they might refuse to make new loans in an attempt to win further concessions (in addition to those
exacted by the IMF) from the regime." Carl Peterson, Brazil Takes the IMF Cure, THE NATION,
April 2, 1983, at 393.
In his article on Latin American debt, Professor Jacob Dollinger cites two sources describing, in
almost the same terms, the combined pressure exercised historically by the banks and the IMF in
that region:
1) the debtor state allowed its financial conditions to deteriorate until it was unable to meet
interest payments;
2) the commercial bank lenders then refused to reschedule or refinance loans unless the debtor
state agreed to IMF conditions... ;
3) debtors officially requested IMF assistance and accepted an IMF prescribed austerity pro-
gram that lowered the domestic standard of living and facilitated social and political discourse
(or... exacerbated social and political tensions);
4) the banks, after some delay and squabbling among themselves, gave new credit or resched-
uled the debt; new loans carried relatively short terms, high interest rates and large negotiation
fees.
Jacob Dollinger, supra note 13, Solution of Latin American External Debt, XVII CuRso DE DER-
ECHO INTERNATIONAL, n.32, Aug., 1990, citing Barry C. Barnett, et al., On Third World Debt, 25
HARv. INT'L L.J. 83, 95-6 (1984), and Nancy A. Aliquo, Treasury Secretary James Baker's "Pro-
gram for Sustained Growth" or the International Debt Crisis: Three Steps Toward Global Financial
Security, 4 DICK. J. INT'L L. 281 (1985-86).
182 Lord Lever of Manchester, quoted in THE INDEPENDENT, Mar. 3, 1987, at 15.
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ments, encouraged bank overseas lending on the theory that the private
flow of funds would aid U.S. export and job markets.18 3
Some writers have suggested that even commercial lenders dealing in
sovereign finance are making essentially political decisions, and that the
debt crisis is, first and foremost, a matter of foreign affairs. 184
4. The Commercial Lenders' Behavior
Shortly after Mexico's 1982 announcement of default, The Econo-
mist opined that "the banks have nobody but themselves to blame. For
many years they lent on risks that were known to be bad, and did so
merely because their competitors did so, because they did not want to be
left out of the crowd."' 815 Scholars have suggested that "the massive flow
of commercial loans to LDCs in the past decade demonstrates the banks'
inability to exercise self restraint."1 6 Professor Andreas Lowenfeld,
however, asserts a more specific motivation: "... this lending went on just
because the lenders - i.e., the major commercial banks - had funds on
which they needed to earn high returns to make up, in effect, for the
bidding by which they had induced the oil producing countries to place
their funds with them."18 7 The private bank loans to LDCs earned
higher interest than loans to industrialized countries because of the
higher risk. 181
183 International Bank Lending: Hearings Before the Sub-Committee on Financial Institutions Su-
pervision, Regulation and Insurance of the House Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs,
98th Cong. 1st Sess. (1983) (statement of C.T. Conover, Comptroller of the Currency).
184 See, eg., W.H. Knight, Jr., International Debt and the Act of State Doctrine: Judicial Ab-
stenance Reconsidered, 13 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 64, 73 (1988).
185 Bottomless Debt EcoNoMisT, Dec. 11, 1982, at 12.
186 Barry C. Barnett et al., On Third World Debt, 25 HARV. INT'L L. J. 83, 131 (1984).
187 Lowenfeld, supra note 181, at 1069. At the IMF's 1979 annual meeting, Anthony Sampson
reported that international bankers had begun to behave like aggressive salesmen. "As they pursue
their prey down the escalators, up the elevators, along the upstairs corridors into the suites, they
cannot conceal their anxiety to do business. For these men who look as if they might have been
trained to say No from their childhood are actually trying to sell loans. 'I've got good news for you,'
[Sampson] heard one eager contact man telling a group of American bankers; 'I think they'll be able
to take your money."' ANTHONY SAMPSON, THE MONEY LENDERS: BANKERS IN A WORLD OF
TURMOIL 12 (2nd ed., 1981), quoted in MAKIN, supra note 20, at 45.
188 The money loaned by the London market "often had a maximum eight-to-ten year maturity
structure, some of it under innovative financing techniques due in a single 'bullet' payment." Levin-
son, supra note 2, at 495. The interest rate on such loans was tied to the London Interbank Offered
Rate (LIBOR) and was adjusted every six months. Id. The developing countries were charged
floating interest rates based on spreads of 0.8% to 2.25% above the LIBOR, which fluctuates with
the U.S. economy and has, in the last 20 years, ranged from six to 20%. Nera Seidman Makgetta,
External Influences on Third World Debt, 12 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 59 (1988). See also
Post, supra note 94, at 1072-1073. Andreas Lowenfeld, forward to The International Debt Crisis, A
Symposium held at New York University School of Law on Dec. 14-15, 1984, 17 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. &
POL. 485, 486 (1985) (explaining that some believe the IMF might have been sleeping in 1982, and
not surveilling the international banking transactios and "that petrodollar deposits were coming in
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The need and resultant competition to recycle oil money signifi-
cantly affected banking practices. Banks simply "lent too much money
with too little thought .... 1, 8 9 This was perhaps inevitable, given that
the prestige, compensation and career advancement opportunities of indi-
vidual banking officials often depended on the numbers of large loans
they made."9 Conspicuously absent from the bargaining process was
any incentive to exercise restraint. In its 1982 "International Banking
Survey," The Economist observed that "the banker probably has a job life
expectancy of about three years before he moves on to other tasks. The
job life of the finance minister of the borrowing country is probably
shorter still. It will not be they who have to pick up the pieces when the
bicycle finally crashes." 191
Additional incentive to make increasing numbers of loans with de-
creasing regard for their risk came from the questionable practice of
charging a wide variety of loan "fees" and counting those fees as current
bank income. Professor Lichtenstein writes that:
the multinational bank lending syndicates on sovereign loans were behaving
very much like syndicates of investment bankers and were assessing a
number of special fees. In addition to commitment fees generally charged
in connection with loans, one or more of the banks in these syndicates were
also sharing "front-end" fees, agency fees, advisory fees and expense reim-
bursements. The special fees would be of considerable importance to banks
to the extent that, as an accounting matter, the banks take them into in-
come at the moment the lending arrangements are put together, rather than
treating the fees as additional interest, which under accounting rules must
be accrued over the term of the loan. [Federal] regulators were concerned
that some of these fees provide an added incentive to seek out international
loans in order to boost earnings immediately and, once this has occurred, to
sustain past earning levels. 192
Thus, the "loans made in the early 1970s took their profits up front, but
so fast that ambitious bankers were aggressively fighting over acquiring and relending them... at
least as of 1981 and 1982.")
189 Krugman, supra note 113, at 141, 142.
190 "Bankers competed to make these loans because their advancements and, apparently, in some
cases, compensation, were directly awarded by the volume of dollar loans extended." Robert
Lenzner, Decline in Oil Prices Brings Help to Some Nations, Damage to Others, BOSTON GLOBE,
Mar. 6, 1983, at 9.
191 International Banking Survey: A Nightmare of Debt, ECONOMIST, Mar. 20, 1982, at 55.
192 Lichtenstein, supra note 58, at 187. The 1983 International Lending Supervision Act, passed
in response to the crisis, provides in section 906 (a) that "No banking institution shall charge, in
connection with the restructuring of an international loan, any fee exceeding the administrative cost
of the restructuring unless it amortizes such fee over the effective life of each such loan."
There is also the somewhat suspicious circumstance that a significant portion of the money
loaned to the LDCs ended up back in the developed countries - on deposit in commercial banks.
No figures are available for sub-Saharan Africa, but a study of eight highly indebted Latin American
countries showed that "for every $1 lent to the group, $0.30 left the country in the form of capital
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the principal was not due until the end of the decade." '193
It is a common perception among the debtor countries that "they
were the victims of aggressive salesmanship in the days when they were
visited by hordes of foreign bankers with briefcases full of petrodol-
Jars.... ,,194 Sovereign governments do not automatically have superior
bargaining power over commercial entities. They too can be subject to
tremendous pressure based on lack of expertise, urgent domestic need
and the unavailability of meaningful alternatives. 195 The debt reschedul-
ing process discussed above illustrates how easily sovereign borrowers
can find themselves in a virtually powerless position. One writer likened
the lending and rescheduling process to "offering crates of whisky to an
alcoholic." 196
Professor Jacob Dollinger concludes, with specific respect to Latin
America's external debt, but no less applicable to that of sub-Saharan
Africa, that:
we had in the seventies a feverish run by government officials of the devel-
oping countries and by executives of the large American banks to increase
the debts of the former to the latter, in which the representatives of both
sides may have had personal interests, whereas those loan reschedulings,
according to later analysis, were in their larger part against the interests of
lenders and borrowers. 197
The Banking Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives concluded
that "the lending banks had been imprudent and the regulators had been
almost criminally lax and complacent." 19'
Commercial institutions began significant lending to sub-Saharan
countries only when those institutions found themselves awash in pe-
trodollars in the early 1970s.199 The commercial banks' urgent need to
lend coincided with increased sub-Saharan borrowing needs resulting
from the oil crisis, world recession and a slowdown in IMF and World
Bank lending. Neither the commercial lenders nor the borrowers had
sufficient incentive to exercise restraint. It is clear from subsequent de-
flight. The beneficiaries of capital flight, of course, have almost always been the developed countries
and their private banks." Garg, supra note 4, at 48 (footnotes omitted).
193 Jonathan D. Aronson, Financial Institutions in the International Monetary System, 12 CASE
WEsT. REs. J. INT'L L. 341, 352 (1980).
194 Peider K6nz, The Third World Debt Crisis, 12 HASTINGS INT'L & COM. L. REv. 527, 528
(1989).
195 See Detlev F. Vagts, Coercion andForeign Investment Rearrangements, 72 AM. J. INT'L L. 17,
21, 31 (1978).
196 Anthony Sampson, The Money Lenders [new page #] (1983). Professor Dollinger argues that
the rescheduling process is a clear example of coercion. Dollinger, supra note 13, at 149.
197 Dollinger, supra note 13, at 151.
198 Lichtenstein, supra note 58, at 188.
199 See, Part II, supra.
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velopments that far too much money was lent. Because the debt crisis
and proposals for its solution have significant policy ramifications, they
are often considered exclusively from a public policy perspective. The
following Parts of this article suggest not that the policy perspective is
unimportant, but that it can be better informed by legal analysis.
V. CERTAIN LEGAL DOCTRINES R.EECTED AS INEFFECTIVE
We now turn to legal analysis of the sub-Saharan debt crisis. This
Part will briefly note but reject certain arguably relevant legal principles
that are in fact not likely to be useful because they require the difficult
showing of bad intent on the lenders' part or are otherwise technically
unworkable.
The first category includes, for example, fraud. Unlike mere misrep-
resentation in contract formation, a successful showing of fraud may en-
title the claimant to punitive damages. However, because a claim for
punitive damages is unlikely in the circumstances that are the subject of
this article, there is no utility in undertaking the relatively difficult task
of demonstrating fraud.2 '0 The second category could include arguments
disavowing contractual liability based on principles of agency and state
succession.201 Also included in this category are defenses such as the
jurisdictional doctrine of sovereign immunity and the quasi-jurisdictional
Act of State Doctrine, each of which warrants some discussion.
A. Foreign Sovereign Immunity
Sovereign immunity is a principle of international law recognized in
the United States by statute.20 2 It acts as a jurisdictional bar to cases
which involve disputes related to official or sanctioned acts of foreign
countries. A United States court invoking the doctrine does not "vali-
date" the foreign government's position; it simply refuses to hear the case
because legal questions involving foreign sovereigns often involve politi-
cally sensitive decisions that might interfere with one or more policies of
the Executive Branch of the United States government. 203
The doctrine of sovereign immunity is codified in the Federal Sover-
200 The tort of fraud requires scienter and is harder, therefore, to show than the type of innocent
misrepresentation that can afford a basis for rescission in contract law.
201 For an interesting discussion of the potential applicability of public international law princi-
ples regarding state succession to international lending, see, Baloro, supra note 13, at 151.
202 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (1988).
203 See generally, Kevin M. McGinty, Note, Opening the Courts to Protect Interests Abroad: The
Effect of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act on Litigation With Developing Countries, 10 B.C.
THIRD WORLD L.J. 63, 74 (1990).
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eign Immunities Act ("FSIA".)204 Under the FSIA, a court in the
United States can exercise subject matter jurisdiction 20 5 over a foreign
sovereign only if an exception applies.20 6 The Act recognizes several ex-
ceptions.207 One of these is a broad "commercial activities" exception:20 8
foreign sovereigns are not immune from judicial process in any suit in
which the cause of action is based upon commercial activity that has a
jurisdictional nexus with the United States.2 ' 9
The FSIA defines "commercial activity" as "either a regular course
of commercial conduct or a particular commercial transaction or act
204 Id.
205 See Morel de Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 748 F.2d 790, 793 (2d Cir. 1984) cert denied, 471
U.S. 1125 (1985). The FSIA confers original jurisdiction on district courts "without regard to
amount in controversy of any nonjury civil action against a foreign state as defined in section 1603(a)
of this title as to any claim for relief in personam with respect to which the foreign state is not
entitled to immunity .... 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) (1988). In turn, 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (1988) establishes
the general rule that "a foreign state shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the
United States ... except as provided in sections 1605 to 1607 of this chapter...." Id.
206 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) (1988).
207 When an exception to immunity applies, "the foreign sovereign shall be liable in the same
manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances.... ." 28 U.S.C.
§ 1606 (1988).
208 The FSIA was enacted in 1976 to codify the restrictive principle of sovereign immunity. H.R.
Rep. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. at 7 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6605-07.
Under this principle, the immunity of a foreign state is "restricted" to suits involving a foreign state's
public acts (jure imperii) and does not extend to suits based on its commercial or private acts (fure
gestionis). See id. at 6605.
The principle of restrictive immunity for commercial activities is embodied in 28 U.S.C.
§ 1605(a)(2) of the FSIA, the so-called "commercial activity" exception. Id. at 1617.
209 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2)(1988). The existence of subject matter jurisdiction under the FSIA is a
question of law which the court reviews de novo. See America West Airlines v. GPA Group, Ltd.,
877 F.2d 793, 796 (9th Cir. 1989).
The FSIA identifies three types of acts that are sufficiently connected to the United States to
satisfy the jurisdictional nexus requirement to the commercial activities exception: (1) a commercial
activity carried on in the United States; (2) an act performed in the United States in connection with
a commercial activity carried on outside the United States; and (3) a commercial activity carried on
outside the United States that has a direct effect in the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2). See
Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A., 764 F.2d 1101, 1110 (5th Cir. 1985).
A sovereign, however, does not abrogate its sovereign immunity simply because it conducts
commercial operations that have a connection with the United States. Not only must there be a
jurisdictional nexus between the United States and the commercial acts of the foreign sovereign,
there must also be a connection between the plaintiff's cause of action and the commercial acts of the
foreign sovereign, Vencedom Oceanica Navigacion, S.A. v. Compagnie Nationale Algerienne De
Navigation, 730 F.2d 195, 199-204 (5th Cir. 1984), and the connection between the cause of action
and the sovereign's commercial acts in the United States must be material. See America West Air-
lines, 877 F.2d at 797; Compania Mexicana de Aviacion, S.A. v. United States District Court for the
Cent. Dist. of Calif., 859 F.2d at 1360 (9th Cir. Date); Alberti v. Empresa Nicaragense de ]a Came,
705 F.2d 250, 254 (7th Cir. 1983). Stena Rederi AB v. Comision de Contratos Del Comite Ejecutivo
General del Sindicato Revolutionario de Trabajadores Petroleros de la Republica Mexicana, S.C.,
923 F.2d 380, 386 (5th Cir. 1991).
Contractual Bases for Adjusting Afican Debt
13:258(1992)
*..,21o and instructs the court to contemplate the essential nature, not
the purpose, of the activity in determining whether an activity is com-
mercial or public. If the activity is a type that a private person would
normally engage in for profit, it is generally "commercial" within the
meaning of the commercial activity exception to the FSIA.211 Issuing
public debt has been held to be a commercial activity within the meaning
of the FSIA.212 Moreover, most international loan agreements require
that sovereign borrowers expressly waive any claim to sovereign immu-
nity in connection with the transaction.213 Thus, what might first appear
a simple and complete solution to the debtor governments' problem is
not, in fact, likely to afford relief.
B. The Act of State Doctrine
Similarly promising on its face is the Act of State Doctrine, which
"prohibits U.S. courts from reaching the merits of an issue - even
though [they] otherwise have jurisdiction - in order to avoid embarrass-
ment of foreign governments in politically sensitive matters and interfer-
ence with the conduct of our own foreign policy. '214 The doctrine
applies where the acts called into question are clearly sovereign in nature
and are performed within the foreign country's own territory.215
The Act of State Doctrine is premised upon the notion that "[e]very
sovereign state is bound to respect the independence of every other sover-
eign state, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the
acts of the government of another done within its own territory.
216
For the U.S., the doctrine is also an outgrowth of the constitution-
ally required separation of powers,217 and the long-standing belief that
210 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d) (1988).
211 Id; Callejo, 764 F.2d at 1109.
212 The Republic of Argentina v. Weltover Inc., 112 S.Ct. 858 (1992); Shapiro v. Republic of
Bolivia, 930 F.2d 1013, 1018 (2d Cir. 1991).
213 International Debt Restructuring, supra note 14, at 53.
214 West v. Multibanco Comermex, 807 F.2d 820, 827 (9th Cir. 1987).
215 Chudian v. Phillipine National Bank, 734 F. Supp. 415, 420 (C.D. Cal. 1990)(citing Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964)).
216 Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252, (1897).
217 The doctrine "arises out of the basic relationships between branches of government in a sys-
tem of separation of powers.... The doctrine as formulated in past decisions expresses the strong
sense of the Judicial Branch that its' engagement in the task of passing on the validity of foreign acts
of state may hinder rather than further this country's pursuit of goals both for itself and for the
community of nations as a whole in the international sphere." Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 423.
Originally linked with principles of sovereign immunity, the act of state doctrine has recently
been described as "aris(ing) out of the basic relationships between branches of government in a
system of separation of powers." Id "... . The policy concerns underlying the doctrine focus on the
preeminence of the political branches, and particularly the executive, in the conduct of foreign pol-
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the United States should "speak with one voice" in its interactions with
foreign nations. Therefore, the courts generally defer making judgments
when a foreign governmental entity is involved, choosing instead to leave
international dispute resolution to the executive branch.218 Unlike the
relatively rigid FSIA, the Act of State Doctrine is a "prudential doc-
trine" by which American courts implicitly validate acts done by or on
behalf of foreign governments by declining to question the legality of
such acts.2 19 Thus, the Act of State Doctrine would appear to afford a
basis upon which a United States court could refuse to rule on the issue
of whether foreign debt is collectible by action in a U.S. court.
The appeal of this doctrine in connection with LDC's debt is that it
is premised primarily upon policy considerations, rather than on legal
rules and precedent. The doctrine demands a case-by-case analysis of the
extent to which separation of powers concerns are implicated in the con-
text of a particular dispute.2 20
In 1985, however, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit held in Allied Bank International v. Banco Credito Agricola
icy. (Citations) Therefore, the applicability of the doctrine depends on the likely impact on interna-
tional relations that would result from judicial consideration of the foreign sovereign's act. If
adjudication would embarrass or hinder the executive in the realm of foreign relations, the court
should refrain from inquiring into the validity of the foreign state's act." Id
218 The Act of State Doctrine declares that a United States court will not adjudicate a politically
sensitive dispute which would require the court to judge the legality of the sovereign act of a foreign
state.... The doctrine recognizes the institutional limitations of the courts and the peculiar require-
ments of successful foreign relations. To participate adeptly in the global community, the United
States must speak with one voice and pursue a careful and deliberate foreign policy. The political
branches of our government are able to consider the competing economic and political considera-
tions and respond to the public will in order to carry on foreign relations in accordance with the best
interests of the country as a whole. The courts, in contrast, focus on single disputes and make deci-
sions on the basis of legal principles. The timing of our decisions is largely a result of our caseload
and of the random tactical considerations that motivate parties to bring lawsuits and to seek delay or
expedition. When the courts engage in piecemeal adjudication of the legality of the sovereign acts of
states, they risk disruption of our country's international diplomacy. The executive may utilize pro-
tocol, economic sanction, compromise, delay, and persuasion to achieve international objectives. Ill-
timed judicial decisions challenging the acts of foreign states could nullify these tools and embarrass
the United States in the eyes of the world. Intern. Ass'n of Machinists, Etc. v. OPEC, 649 F.2d
1354, 1358 (9th Cir. 1981).
219 The Act of State Doctrine operates to confer presumptive validity on certain acts of foreign
sovereigns by rendering non-justiciable claims that challenge such acts. Allied Bank International v.
Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 757 F.2d 516, 520 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 473 U.S. 934
(1985). This is somewhat similar to the doctrine of sovereign immunity, but the Act of State Doc-
trine is applied to a case which has already been received by a court, whereas sovereign immunity
works to deny a court's jurisdiction, thereby effectively preventing the court from hearing the case in
any manner.
220 Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300, 316 n.38 (2d
Cir. 1981). Allied Bank, 757 F.2d at 520-521.
Contractual Bases for Adjusting Afican Debt
13:258(1992)
de Cartago,221 that neither the Act of State Doctrine nor the principle of
comity required the court to let stand the Costa Rican government's uni-
lateral declaration of a moratorium on payments in connection with its
external debt.2 22 If this precedent is followed, the Act of State Doctrine
is probably unavailable for use as an effective defense for sovereign debt-
ors facing collection suits by commercial lenders.223
C. Public Policy
"Public policy," as the term is used in contract law, is a rubric too
amorphous to be called a doctrine.224 Professor Farnsworth refers to it
as a "ground for unenforceability."225 It describes an ever-changing col-
lection of considerations that will occasionally outweigh the strong pre-
sumption in favor of freedom of contract.226 Unlike the doctrines of
mistake, misrepresentation, duress and undue influence, public policy as
a ground for unenforceability is based "on reluctance to aid the promisee
rather than on solicitude for the promisor. ' '227
In the case of sub-Saharan Africa, it is arguable that the above de-
221 Allied Bank, 757 F.2d at 516.
222 Id. at 522. The Allied Bank case involved debts owed by three banks wholly owned by the
government of Cost Rica to a syndicate of U.S. and foreign banks. See generally, Robert P. Coyne,
Note, Allied Bank III and United States Treatment of Foreign Exchange Controls: The Effects of the
Act of State Doctrine The Principle of Comity, and Article VIII, Section 2(b) of the International
Monetary Fund Agreement, 9 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 409 (1986).
223 For criticisms of the trilogy of Allied Bank cases, see Jonathan M. Clark, Jr., Note, The
Resolution of Act of State Doctrines Involving Indefinitely Situated Property, 25 VA. J. INT. L. 901
(1985); Carsten T. Ebenroth & Louise E. Teitz, Winning (or Losing) by Default: Act of State, Sover-
eign Immunity and Comity In International Business Transactions, 19 INT'L LAW 225 (1985); Joseph
E. Frumkin, The Act of State Doctrine and Foreign Sovereign Defaults on United States Bank Loans:
A New Focus for a Muddled Doctrine, 133 U. PENN. L. REV. 469 (1985); Roger M. Zaitzeff & C.
Thomas Kunz, The Act of State Doctrine and The Allied Bank Case, 40 Bus. LAW. 449 (1985).
224 A nineteenth century English judge described public policy as "a very unruly horse, and when
once you get astride it you never know where it will carry you. It may lead you from the sound law.
It is never argued at all but when other points fail." Burrough, J. in Richardson v. Mellish, 2 Bing.
229, 252, 130 Eng. Rep. 294, 303 (1824).
225 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 5.1, at 345 (2d ed. 1990).
226 Id., citing Printing and Numerical Registering Co. v. Sampson, L.R. 19 Eq. 462 (1875):
[You are not to extend arbitrarily these rules which say that a given contract is void as being
against public policy, because if there is one thing which more than another public policy re-
quires it is that men of full age and competent understanding shall have the utmost liberty of
contracting, and that their contracts when entered into freely and voluntarily shall be held
sacred and shall be enforced by courts of justice.
Id. p. 345, fn. 1. See also, Sternaman v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 170 N.Y. 13, 62 N.E. 763 (1902).
227 FARNSWORTH, supra note 225, at 346. More specifically, Professor Farnsworth states that:
A court may be moved by two considerations in refusing to enforce an agreement on grounds of
public policy. First, it may see its refusal as an appropriate sanction to discourage undesirable
conduct, either by the parties or by others. Second, it may regard enforcement of the promise as
an inappropriate use of the judicial process to uphold an unsavory agreement.
IM. at 346.
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scribed lending practices of Western commercial institutions228 do not
merit legitimation through judicial enforcement of the resultant loan
agreements. The courts, however, have not generally used the public
policy approach to expand protection already available through statute
or case law based on more conventional doctrine. In the case of the LDC
debt crisis, such protection could include the law of usury and, more
recently, lender liability theories, which are discussed below. Even when
protection based on more conventional legal sources is unavailable,
courts have been generally reluctant to refuse enforcement for reasons of
public policy, unless the contract at issue is thought to offend a widely
held moral value in some basic way. In this context, "moral value" has
been narrowly construed along the lines of such issues as gambling, mar-
riage and fiduciary relations.229
D. Lender Liability
Some commentators argue that various theories of lender liability,
including fraud, misrepresentation and coercion, are readily applicable to
the facts of the LDC debt crisis.230 If the best defense is a good offense, it
is difficult to imagine a more intuitively appealing position from the
debtor countries' point of view than the assertion of lender liability.
"Lender liability," which has been described as an emerging doctrine,
actually refers to a collection of theories - some old, some relatively
new as applied to lenders.231 The more established theories include
228 See supra Part IV, Section B, Subsection 4.
229 See, eg., Cudahy Junior Chamber of Commerce v. Quirk, 165 N.W.2d 116 (Wis. 1969) (gam-
bling); Hewitt v. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d 1204 (Ill. 1979) (enforcement of cohabitation contracts disfa-
vored as undermining institution of marriage); Corti v. Fleisher, 417 N.E.2d 764 (Ill. App. 1981)
(contract requiring breach of fiduciary duty).
230 Professor Jacob Dollinger argues that various theories of lender liability should be applied.
"In the U.S. courts the 'lender liability' theory has been raised as a basis to borrowers fighting back
against their bank lenders' claims. 'Lender Liability' uses traditional legal theories such as fraud,
bad faith, fiduciary responsibility and interference with a business to hold lender accountable for
unfairness in calling a loan or mistake made in controlling the management decisions of a debtor in
trouble. Dollinger, supra note 13, at 147 (citing Debra Cassens Moss, Borrowers Fight Back With
Lender Liability, 73 Mar. A.B.A.J. 65 (1987).
I propose that lender liability should be applied where debtor can prove that lender induced him
to take the loan without having duly checked borrower's industrial and financial capacity to
complete the project for which the loan was being taken and repay it in the agreed upon dates.
Banks are usually much better prepared to analyze and evaluate potential debtor's industrial,
economic and financial capabilities; this is, after all, their main field of action and income. If
lenders of the [developed] countries were imprudent, unwise and reckless it is to be accepted
that they are liable in some form and in some proportion for the disastrous consequences of
debtor's defaults. Dollinger, supra note 13, at 147.
231 See David T. Lowell, Lender Liability Revisited, BANKING L. REv. 38 (1991). See generally,
JOSEPH J. NORTON & W. MIKE BAGGETr, LENDER LIABILrry LAW AND LIrIGATION (1991); WIL-
LIAM M. BURKE, LENDER LIABILrrY(1992).
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fraud, misrepresentation, duress and breach of contract. Most important
among the newer theories of lender liability are those based on breach of
a fiduciary or quasi-fiduciary relationship between the lender and the
borrower.2 32
Successful assertion of such a fiduciary or quasi-fiduciary relation-
ship imposes upon the lender a significantly higher duty than that of
good faith - which is required in the performance of all contracts. Fur-
thermore, a lender's breach of this higher duty entitles the borrower to
the wider range of tort damages - including punitive damages. A tril-
ogy of California cases marks the path of this development from contract
to tort law.
The 1984 case Seaman's Direct Buying Service, Inc. v. Standard Oil
Company 233is best known for its recognition of the new tort of inten-
tional and bad faith denial of the existence of a contract. Also in Sea-
man's, however, the California Supreme Court raised the question
whether damages based on tort liability should be available in actions
based on breaches of commercial contracts.234 The next year, relying
largely on the Seaman's dictum, a California Court of Appeal held that a
bank's relationship with its depositors was "at least quasi-fiduciary" and,
therefore, justified tort liability for breach of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing.235 One year later, a California appellate
court extended this quasi-fiduciary duty to include a bank's relationship
with a loan customer, where the loan customer had relied heavily on the
advice of a bank officer. 2 36 These three law-changing cases, coming in
rapid succession, appeared to have established an important beachhead
for debtors' litigation. Subsequent developments, however, appear to
have stopped the emerging doctrine in its tracks.
In 1989, a California Court of Appeal held that there is no fiduciary
or quasi-fiduciary duty in a regular commercial loan transaction.237 The
court stated that the 1985 and 1986 cases:
are inconsistent with both past authority and current trends in the law. It
has long been regarded as "axiomatic that the relationship between a bank
and its depositor.., is that of a debtor and a creditor." ... "A debt is not a
trust and there is not a fiduciary relationship between debtor and creditor as
232 See generally Alvin C. Harrell, The Bank-Customer Relationship: Evolution of a Modern
Form? 11 OKLA. CrrY U.L. REV. 641 (1986); Lawrence F. Flick, II and Dennis Replansky, Liabil-
ity of Banks to Their Borrowers: Pitfalls and Protections, 103 BANKING L. 1. 220 (1986).
233 36 Cal. 3d 752, 767 (1984).
234 Tort damages were already available in some cases based on breaches of insurance or employ-
ment contracts, because of the special relationships those contracts are said to establish.
235 Commercial Cotton Co. v. United California Bank, 163 Cal. App. 3d 511 (1985).
236 Barrett v. Bank of America, 183 Cal. App. 3d 1362 (1986).
237 Price v. Wells Fargo Bank, 213 Cal. App. 3d 465 (1989).
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 13:258(1992)
such." The same principle should apply with even greater clarity to the
relationship between a bank and its loan customers.238
Two years later, in Copesky v. Superior Court,239 the California Court of
Appeal repeated its conclusion that, as a general rule, banks are not fidu-
ciaries for their depositors. The Copesky court also stated, in dictum,
that it saw no relevant difference between bank-depositor and bank-bor-
rower relationships.
Quite apart from the doctrine's uncertain status, lender liability
would fit the facts of the sub-Saharan debt crisis awkwardly, at best.
Lender liability has typically been asserted when banks refuse to make or
restructure loans. Sub-Saharan Africa's problem, on the other hand, is
not the refusal to make or restructure loans, but the making of too many
loans that were too large and were imprudent, at best. Moreover, lender
liability suits seek contract and even tort damages, whereas LDC debtors
should seek excuse, at most, and perhaps mere judicial adjustment, of
their contractual obligations. The doctrines discussed below are better
suited to this relatively modest objective.
VI. CONTRACTUAL BASES FOR ADJUSTING SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA'S
EXTERNAL DEBT
This Part proposes a solution-oriented reconceptualization of the
sub-Saharan debt crisis based on well-established principles of United
States contract law. The position advanced below is as follows. First,
the burden of repayment has become so onerous as to perhaps render
enforcement of the loan agreements unconscionable. Second, the very
existence of the many plans described above for dealing with the third
world debt crisis (and, indeed, the uniform use of the word "crisis") re-
flects a general recognition that it is impossible for debtor countries,
many of whom are experiencing negative economic growth, to repay
their exponentially expanding external debt under the terms of the origi-
nal or even rescheduled loan agreements. That which is impossible is, a
fortiori, impracticable. Third, the parties' shared assumptions regarding
the debtors' ability to repay based on certain economic "facts" reflect a
profound mutual mistake and warrant equitable adjustment of the debt
to an amount that reasonably can be repaid.
238 Id. at 476 (1989) (citations omitted). See also Mitsui Manufacturers Bank v. Superior Court
of San Diego, 212 Cal. App. 3d 726 (1989), specifically rejecting the argument that the quasi-fiduci-
ary relationship asserted in Commercial Cotton should apply to commercial loan transactions.
239 229 Cal. App. 3d 678, 694 (1991).
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A. Excuse From Contractual Obligation, Generally
Though often stated as an absolute, the maxim pacta sunt servanda
("agreements are to be observed") has always been subject to qualifica-
tion. 40 The important qualifications of - or exceptions to - the rule
(i.e., bases upon which a party to a contract can be excused from per-
forming his or her obligations thereunder) are often divided into two cat-
egories: (1) those based on circumstances existing when the contract was
made (e.g., unconscionability and mutual mistake), and (2) those based
on subsequent developments (e.g., impracticability). This distinction
seems useful - if only to compartmentalize an amorphous, discretionary
and necessarily fact-reliant area of legal doctrine. The incentive to seek
clear (if often unimportant) factual distinctions among cases in which
parties seek excuse is also enhanced by the "all-or-nothing" nature of the
remedy traditionally afforded in such cases: discharge of contractual du-
ties. Often, however, this supposed distinction has no real importance or
utility.
Consider the traditional example of a contract to sell a horse that, at
the time set for transfer of ownership, is discovered to be dead with no
fault attributable to either party. If the horse was dead when the contract
was made, performance should be excused based on mutual mistake;2 41 if
the horse died after the contract was made, excuse should be based on
the doctrine of impracticability or its predecessor, impossibility of per-
formance. Because the result is the same, however, the distinction be-
tween existing and supervening bases for excuse generally makes little
difference.24 2
The position advanced below is that the doctrines of unconscionabil-
ity, impracticability and mutual mistake are distinguishable but substan-
tially overlapping. The principal differences among the doctrines lie in
certain technical requirements of their application, which make uncon-
scionability problematic, impracticability readily arguable, and mutual
mistake the most applicable of these doctrines to the facts of the sub-
Saharan debt crisis. These three doctrines are discussed below in this
descending order of difficulty of application.
The final section of this Part argues that the appropriate solution of
the sub-Saharan debt crisis is not excuse but equitable adjustment. Be-
240 Stees v. Leonard, 20 Minn. 448, 451 (1874).
241 Dover Pool & Raquet Club v. Brookings, 322 N.E.2d 168 (Mass. 1975).
242 The UCC has abandoned the pretense of such a distinction. U.C.C. § 2-613 governs casualty
to identified goods. Comment 2 thereto states simply: "[tihe section applies whether the goods were
already destroyed at the time of contracting without the knowledge of either party or whether they
are destroyed subsequently but before the risk of loss passes to the buyer."
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cause equitable adjustment is a flexible, discretionary and particularly
fact-reliant doctrine, all of the facts are relevant. Thus, despite the artifi-
cial compartmentalization of these facts under the doctrinal headings be-
low, the whole of the legal argument is in effect greater than the sum of
its parts.
The doctrine of unconscionability is arguably the most basic of the
excuse doctrines and provides a useful backdrop for consideration of the
doctrines of impracticability and mutual mistake.
B. Unconscionability and the Limits of the Analogy to Private
Parties Under United States Law
The doctrine of unconscionability as a basis for relief from contrac-
tual obligations is at least three centuries old.243 In a 1750 English case,
an unconscionable agreement was defined as one that "no man in his
senses and not under delusion could make on the one hand, and no hon-
est and fair man would accept on the other; which are unequitable and
unconscientious bargains; and of such even the Common Law has taken
notice."244
Today section 2-302 of the Uniform Commercial Code gives courts
broad latitude to consider such fairness issues:
If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the con-
tract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may
refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the con-
tract without the unconscionable clause, or it may limit the application of
any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.245
Section 2-302 represents a critical innovation because it is not limited to
suits in equity. Comment 1 to Section 2-302 states:
This section is intended to make it possible for the courts to police explicitly
243 HOWARD 0. HUNTER, MODERN LAW OF CONTRACTS, 12-64 (1986).
244 Earl of Chesterfield v. Janssen, 28 ER 82 (1750). The final portion of the quote is a direct
reference to the fact that unconscionability arose as an equitable remedy in the context of a bifur-
cated judicial system and was most frequently advanced as a defense in actions for specific perform-
ance. HUNTER, supra note 243, at 12-65. Courts of equity were established for the express purpose
of exercising greater discretion than did courts of law. Therefore, they were not hesitant to police
bargains for substantive unfairness. It is generally acknowledged, however, that courts of law fre-
quently accomplished the same objective by stretching - sometimes torturing - traditional legal
defenses such as fraud and failure of consideration. See, eg., WILLIAM D. HAwKLAND, 2 HAWK-
LAND UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SERIES § 2-302, at 242-43 (1992). The significance of the
distinction between legal and equitable remedies is, of course, now greatly diminished. Furthermore,
as a practical matter, a suit to collect a debt is the functional equivalent of a suit for specific perform-
ance (perhaps with acceleration and/or consequential damages) - whatever the style of such a suit.
In any event, developments described immediately below have freed the doctrine of unconscionabil-
ity from its original theoretical limitation to actions in which an equitable remedy was sought.
245 U.C.C. § 2-302.
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against the contracts or clauses which they find to be unconscionable. In
the past, such policing has been accomplished by adverse construction of
language, by manipulation of the rules of offer and acceptance or by deter-
minations that the clause is contrary to public policy or to the dominant
purpose of the contract.246
Section 2-302 (by the terms of UCC Article Two, of which it is a
part) applies only to contracts concerning transactions in goods. It has
been widely applied, however, - either by analogy or as a statement of
general principle - in actions involving other types of contracts.' 7 The
Restatement (Second) of Contracts includes a provision analogous to
Section 2-302 but not limited to contracts for transactions in goods.2 4
The drafters of the UCC did not define "unconscionable" except,
amazingly, by reference to the term itself.2 49 The standard is entirely
fact-dependent and, thus, inherently imprecise.250 Professor E. Allan
246 Under UCC section 2-302, a court finding unconscionability may refuse to enforce the entire
contract or void or limit the application of the unconscionable provision(s). Thus, despite the doc-
trine's significant development since its origins in equity, it is still based on withholding relief, rather
than avoidance of obligation. FARNswoRTH, supra note 225, § 4.28, at 327. Therefore, unlike the
doctrines of duress and misrepresentation, which are bases for avoidance, the doctrine of unconscio-
nability carries no inherent requirement that the claimant make restitution. Id.
However, a court using the doctrine of unconscionability could easily accomplish the practical
effect of restitution (i.e., repayment of principal) by refusing to enforce only the loan agreement
provisions governing computation and payment of interest. Alternatively, a court could void the
interest provisions, but then determine that restitution required compensation for the lender's loss of
use of the loaned funds and fill the "gap" in the agreement by establishing a reasonable interest rate.
This last proposal is imminently defensible and, indeed, quite modest, considering that some scholars
have argued that unconscionability should be actionable as a tort. See King, The Tort of Unconscio-
nability: A New Tort for New Times, 23 ST. LOUIS U.L.J. 97, (1979); Note, The Doctrine of Uncon-
scionability: A Sword as Well as a Shield, 29 BAYLOR L. REv. 309 (1977).
Of the UCC's unconscionability provision, Professor Hunter says, "Section 2-302 also allows
courts a wide range of discretion in deciding what to do when unconscionability is found. A court
... may even reform the agreement." HUNTER, supra note 243, § 12.0612] at 12-71. Professor
Hunter describes Vasquez v. Glassboro Serv. Ass'n, 415 A2d 1156 (1980) as involving judicial impli-
cation of "a condition allowing a 'reasonable time' to develop an alternative to performance that was
unconscionable." Id. at 12-71, n. 209.
247 Zapatha v. Dairy Mart, Inc., 408 N.E.2d 1370 (Mass. 1980); Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc., 623
P.2d 165 (Cal. 1981); Weaver v. American Oil Co., 276 N.E.2d 144 (Ind. 1971); Ellsworth Dobbs,
Inc. v. Johnson, 236 A.2d 843 (N.J. 1967); Bekins Bar V Ranch v. Huth, 664 P.2d 455 (Utah 1983).
248 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 208. California omitted section 2-302 when it first
adopted the UCC, but later enacted the substance of the provision without the limitation to con-
tracts for transactions in goods. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1670.5.
249 UCC § 2-302 Comment 1 provides that the "basic test is whether.., the clauses involved are
so one-sided as to be unconscionable under the circumstances..."
250 Unconscionable is a word that defies lawyer-like definition. It is a term borrowed from moral
philosophy and ethics. As close to a definition as we are likely to get is "that which 'affronts the
sense of decency .... 1. JOHN D. CALAMARI AND JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI & PERILLO ON
CONTRACTS § 9-40, at 406 (3rd ed. 1987)(quoting Gimbel Bros., Inc. v. Swift, 307 N.Y.S. 2d 952
(1970)).
Typically, the cases in which unconscionability is found involve gross overall one-sidedness or
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 13:258(1992)
Farnsworth asserts that "it is a source of both strength and weakness"
that unconscionability "is incapable of precise definition."2 1 The rela-
tive vagueness of the doctrine is generally compartmentalized, however,
into its "procedural" and "substantive" aspects: 2 2
The procedural aspect [can be] manifested by... "oppression," which re-
fers to an inequality in bargaining power resulting in no meaningful choice
for the weaker party. .. ."Substantive" unconscionability, on the other
hand, refers to an overly harsh allocation of risks or costs which is not
justified by the circumstances under which the contract was made.., both
procedural and substantive unconscionability must be present before a con-
tract or clause will be held unenforceable. However, there is a sliding scale
relationship between the two concepts; the greater the degree of substantive
unconscionability, the less the degree of procedural unconscionability that
is required to annul the contract or clause.253
Professor Farnsworth asserts a still more organic relationship be-
tween the two traditional aspects of unconscionability: "[u]sually... the
bargain is infected with something more than substantive unfairness. It
is typically mixed with an absence of bargaining ability that does not fall
to the level of incapacity or with an abuse of the bargaining process that
does not rise to the level of misrepresentation, duress, or undue
influence."
2 54
The above quotation seems to describe exactly the circumstances
under which sub-Saharan Africa's external debt arose. It is easily argua-
ble that the predatory behavior of the banks, coupled with the grossly
inferior bargaining power and absence of meaningful choice for the
debtor nations, constitutes procedural unconscionability. 255  Moreover,
the impact of the massive and exponentially expanding burden of repay-
ment on the already abominable living conditions in most sub-Saharan
gross one-sidedness of a term disclaiming a warranty, limiting damages or granting procedural ad-
vantages. Id.
In what may prove to be a leading case, the court indicated that if a clause places great hardship
or risk upon the party in the weaker bargaining position it must be shown that "the provisions were
explained to the other party and came to his knowledge and there was in fact a real and voluntary
meeting of the minds and not merely an objective meeting." Id at 407 (quoting Weaver v. American
Oil Co., 276 N.E.2d 144, 148 (Ind. 1971)).
251 FARNSWORTH, supra note 225, at 327.
252 See Guthmann v. La Vida Llena, 709 P. 2d 675 (N.M. 1985). HUNTER, supra note 243,
§ 12.06[3]; SAMUEL WILLISTON, 15 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 1763A, at 213-215 (3d ed. revised
by Walter H.E. Jaeger, 1972).
253 Carboni v. Arrospide, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 845, 848 (Cal. App. 1st Dist. 1991). Comment 1 to
UCC § 2-302 states "The principle is one of the prevention of oppression and unfair surprise... and
not of disturbance of allocation of risks because of superior bargaining power." The latter part of the
quoted passage, however, is simply at odds with the cases. U.C.C. § 2-302 (1992). See, eg., FARNs-
WORTH, supra note 231, § 4.28, at 332; § 12.06[3], at 73.
254 FARNSWoRTH, supra note 225, at 321.
255 See supra Part IV, Section B.
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debtor countries would seem to constitute substantive unconscionability.
One problem with the application of this doctrine to the sub-Saharan
debt crisis is that the sparse authority for the application of the uncon-
scionability doctrine to loan agreements has narrowly defined substantive
unconscionability to include only the exaction of excessive interest
rates.256 This is because of the requirement that unconscionability be
found as of the time of contract formation.257 However, this requirement
does not preclude a judicial finding that a loan agreement is substantively
unconscionable based on its allocation of risk regarding inflation, cur-
rency values and other economic variables including rates of growth and
development. 258  Thus, although the doctrine of unconscionability has
very rarely been applied to loan agreements, there is no logical reason
that it should not.259
There is, however, a practical reason why the doctrine of unconscio-
nability has rarely been applied to loan agreements - namely, the availa-
bility to private parties under United States law of the bankruptcy
option. A court's consideration of a petition in bankruptcy is not limited
to review of just one of the petitioner's credit agreements, or to consider-
ation of the circumstances existing at the time that agreement was
reached. A debtor seeking discharge of its obligations through bank-
ruptcy need not prove sharp practice on the part of creditors, unfairness
in the relevant agreements or that he or she did not assume the risk of
inability to repay. The bankruptcy option may be available even to a
debtor who expressly assumes the risk, knowingly borrows far too much
and then squanders the loan proceeds in ways that shock the public con-
256 Carboni v. Arrospide, supra note 253.
257 See UCC § 2-302(1) and Comment 1. Professor Hunter states:
Courts have consistently rejected unconscionability defenses that were premised on inflation or
dramatic shifts in currency values. This is not surprising, in view of the requirement that un-
conscionability be determined as of the time of contracting, not as of the time of perform-
ane.... To the extent that there is some dramatic and unexpected change in conditions, the
frustration, impossibility, or commercial impracticability defenses may apply, but not
unconscionability.
HUNTER, supra note 243, § 12.06[5][b], at 12-85. Martin v. Joseph Harris Co. Inc., 767 F.2d 296
(6th Cir. 1985); Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Northern Utilities, Inc., 673 F.2d 323 (10th Cir. 1982).
258 See, eg., Fredonia Broadcasting Corp. v. RCA Corp., 481 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1973); Office
Supply Co. v. Basic/Four Corp., 538 F. Supp. 776 (E.D. Wis. 1982).
259 In December, 1991, the California Court of Appeal found a loan agreement unconscionable
and, in the course of its opinion, stated:
the parties have not cited, and we have not discovered, any case which applies the doctrine of
unconscionabiity to specifically annul or reform a loan which bears a shockingly high rate of
interest. Although one respected commentator has suggested that this would be a proper appli-
cation of the unconscionability doctrine, it appears it has rarely, if ever, been applied in this
context. Nevertheless, we believe we may look to cases finding unconscionability on the basis of
gross price disparity as analogous authority. In essence, the interest rate is the "price" of the
money lent; at some point the price becomes so extreme that it is unconscionable.
Carboni v. Arrospide, supra note 253, at 81-82.
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science." No wonder distressed debtors have not developed the case
law in this area by legally challenging their loan obligations one by one
using the doctrine of unconscionability.
Citicorp Chairman Walter Wriston once asserted that a sovereign
nation "does not go bankrupt. ' 261 For all practical purposes, however,
most debtor nations of sub-Saharan Africa have, indeed, gone bankrupt.
The doctrine of unconscionability should not be written off completely in
the context of the LDC debt crisis. But even if a debtor overcomes the
problem of existing versus supervening conditions and the apparent ri-
gidity of the definition of substantive unconscionability, excuse based on
unconscionability still requires a greater showing of hardship than does
excuse based on impracticability or mutual mistake.262 The application
of the latter two doctrines to sub-Saharan Africa's external debt is ham-
pered by the same lack of direct case authority as the doctrine of uncon-
scionability, and the reason is the same. However, the different technical
requirements of the doctrines of impracticability and mutual mistake
make their logical extension into the void left by the absence of the bank-
ruptcy option for sovereign borrowers less problematic.
C. Impracticability
The doctrine of impracticability is the modern and much liberalized
incarnation of the traditional doctrine of excuse by reason of impossibil-
ity of performance. 263 When applicable, the doctrine excuses perform-
260 But see, I I U.S.C. 523(a)(2) (1988) (exempting from discharge, debt incurred by false pre-
tenses, fraud, etc.).
261 Krugman, supra note 113, at 142.
262 See infra note 273 and accompanying text.
263 The doctrine of excuse by frustration of purpose grows ever more closely related to that of
impracticability. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 265 (1979); FARNSWORTH ON
CONTRACTS, supra note 225, § 9.7. It sometimes allows a party to terminate or modify his contrac-
tual obligations if the underlying purpose or foundation for execution of the contract has changed
due to an unforeseeable condition. (The doctrine arises from the Casebook standard, Krell v. Henry,
2 K.B. 740 (1903), where the Court excused a prospective tenant from his obligation to pay for a
room overlooking the King's coronation route, when the King became ill, and the coronation parade
was cancelled.) Bank of America v. Envases Venezolanos, S.A. 740 F. Supp. 260, 265-266 (S.D.N.Y.
1990).
"Frustration of purpose... focuses on events which materially affect the consideration received
by one party for his performance. Both parties can perform but, as a result of unforeseeable events,
performance by party X would no longer give party Y what induced him to make the bargain in the
first place. Thus frustrated, Y may rescind the contract. Discharge under this doctrine has been
limited to instances where a virtually cataclysmic, wholly unforeseeable event renders the contract
valueless to one party." FARNSWORTH, supra note 225, at 381; see also Coker Int'l, Inc. v. Burling-
ton Industries Inc. 747 F. Supp. 1168, 1171 (D.S.C. 1990); Matter of Fontana D'Oro Foods, Inc.,
122 Misc.2d 1091, 1095, 472 N.Y.S.2d 528, 532 (Sup. Ct. 1983).
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ance "due to intervening events. '264
1. Scope of the Doctrine
Traditionally, excuse based on subsequent developments required
that such developments render a party's performance impossible due to,
for example, supervening incapacity or illegality.265 Over the course of
the twentieth century, however, courts have expanded the traditional
doctrine of impossibility to include those situations where performance
of contractual duties is burdened greatly - without necessarily being
impossible.266 In the 1916 case Mineral Park Land Co. v. Howard,2 6 7
the court accomplished this important transformation with the following
simple assertion: "'A thing is impossible in legal contemplation when it
is not practicable; and a thing is impracticable when it can only be done
at excessive and unreasonable cost.' ",268
264 United States v. General Douglas MacArthur Senior Village, Inc., 508 F.2d 377, 381 (2d
Cir.1974).
265 See, eg., Mulen v. Wareer, 480 S.W.2d 332 (Ark. 1972); Louisville & N.R.R. v. Mottley, 219
U.S. 467 (1911).
266 "The doctrine of impossibility of performance has gradually been freed from the earlier fic-
tional and unrealistic strictures of such tests as the 'implied term' and the parties' 'contemplation.'"
Page, The Development of the Doctrine of Impossibility of Performance, 18 MICH. L. REv. 589, 596
(1920)(citations omitted). "It is now recognized that 'A thing is impossible in legal contemplation
when it is not practicable; and a thing is impracticable when it can only be done at an excessive and
unreasonable cost."' Transatlantic Financing Corp. v. United States, 363 F.2d 312, 315 (D.C. Cir.
1966)(quoting Mineral Park Land Co. v. Howard, 172 P. 458,460 (1916)). "The doctrine ultimately
represents the ever shifting line, drawn by courts hopefully responsive to commercial practices and
mores, at which the community's interest in having contracts enforced according to their terms is
outweighed by the commercial senselessness of requiring performance. When the issue is raised, the
court is asked to construct a condition of performance based on the changed circumstances, a pro-
cess which involves at least three reasonably definable steps." Id.
Rebus sic stantibus is the public international law version of the domestic impracticability doc-
trine. It is an implied condition of international agreements which excuses parties from performance
of their obligations if assumptions or circumstances which were part of the original agreement
change, substantially and in an unforeseeable manner, during the course of the contractual relation-
ship. See generally, Ralph G. Steinhardt, The Role of International Law As a Canon of Domestic
Statutory Construction, 43 VAND. L. REv. 1103 (1990).
Article 62 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that an international
agreement may be terminated due to a fundamental change of circumstances when:
(a) the existence of those circumstances constituted an essential basis of the consent of the
parties to be bound by the treaty; and
(b) the effect of the change is radically to transform the extent of obligations still to be per-
formed under the treaty.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, Article 62.
267 Mineral Park Land Co., 172 Cal. at 289.
268 Id. at 293. The course indicated by Mineral Park has never been reversed. Sixty-five years
later, in Florida Power & Light Co. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 517 F. Supp. 440 (E.D. Va.
1981), the court stated that "[c]ommon law impossibility, formerly a very harsh doctrine which
purported to require a showing of objective or scientific impossibility, has been moderated by case
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Roughly a half century later the Uniform Commercial Code played
an important role in both codifying and catalyzing the doctrine's liberali-
zation.269 Section 2-615 of the UCC, entitled "Excuse by Failure of Pre-
supposed Conditions," provides:
Except so far as seller may have assumed a greater obligation... [dielay in
delivery or non-delivery in whole or in part... is not a breach of his duty
under a contract of sale if performance as agreed has been made impractica-
ble by the occurrence of a contingency the non-occurrence of which was a
basic assumption on which the contract was made....
Section 261 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts - not lim-
ited, even technically, to transactions in goods - adopts a virtually iden-
tical approach:
Where, after a contract is made, a party's performance is made impractica-
ble without his fault by the occurrence of an event the non-occurrence of
which was a basic assumption on which the contract was made, his duty to
render that performance is discharged, unless the language or the circum-
stances indicate the contrary.
The basic elements of the doctrine require the occurrence or non-occur-
rence of an event (e.g., sustained economic development) subsequent to
the execution of the contract which requires one or both parties to as-
sume burdens and risks that were not contemplated when the contract
was made.2 70
The crucial question in applying the doctrine of commercial imprac-
ticability to any given situation is whether, due to the "occurrence of an
event, the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the
law to the point where it is equivalent to impracticability under the [Uniform Commercial] Code."
Westinghouse, 517 F. Supp. at 451.
269 See Transatlantic Finance Corp. v. United States, 363 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
270 Restatement § 263 defines the event the "non-occurrence of which (may be) a basic assump-
tion on which the contract was made": If... the existence of a specific thing is necessary for the
performance of a duty... its failure to come into existence or its destruction or deterioration makes
performance impracticable, (is an event)... "the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption
on which the contract was made." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 263.
Under the Uniform Commercial Code, three conditions must be met before a party is excused
from performance... :"(1) a contingency must occur (2) performance must thereby be made 'im-
practicable' and (3) the non occurrence of the contingency must have been a basic assumption on
which the contract was made." U.C.C. § 2-615. The relevant comments provide: 'Neither is a rise
or a collapse in the market in itself a justification, for that is exactly the type of business risk which
business contracts made at fixed prices are intended to cover. But a severe shortage of raw materials
or of supplies due to a contingency such as... unforeseen shut-down of major sources of supply...
which either causes a marked increase in cost or altogether prevents the seller from securing supplies
necessary to his performance is within the contemplation of this action." (citations omitted) Neal
Cooper Grain Co. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. 508 F.2d 283 (7th Cir. 1974).
Non-delivery is excused under a contract "if performance as agreed has been made impractica-
ble by the occurrence of a contingency the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on
which the contract was made. . ." U.C.C. § 2-615(a).
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contract was made, ' 27 1 the cost of performance has in fact become so
excessive and unreasonable that failure to excuse performance would re-
sult in injustice. The party seeking excuse from performance must show
not only that it can perform only at a loss but also that the loss will be
especially severe and unreasonable.272 This standard, while less than
clear, is also something less than the standard of unconscionability. 273
2. Quantification of Hardship
The central inquiry in the modem doctrine of impracticability is
whether "the circumstanes.... have made performance so vitally differ-
ent from what was anticipated that the contract cannot reasonably be
thought to govern. ' 274 This, of course, only begs the question: "how bad
must conditions be?"'275
Although the indebtedness of the sub-Saharan group is low in com-
parison with the other country groups,276 it is very high in relation to the
affected countries' abilities to repay.
271 Dowlatshahi v. Motorola, Inc. 970 F.2d 289, 294 (7th Cir. 1992).
272 Gulf Oil Co. v. FPC, 563 F.2d 588, 599-600 (3rd Cir. 1977).
273 To satisfy this requirement "The frustration must be so severe that it is not fairly to be re-
garded as within the risks (the obligor) assumed under the contract." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 265 Cmt. a.
274 Eastern Air Lines v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 532 F.2d 957, 991 (5th Cir.1976).
275 Professor Sheldon W. Halpern notes that:
[n]otwithstanding the logic and simplicity of Mineral Park's equation of impossibility with com-
mercial impracticability, its application has been, at best, idiosyncratic. .. If the straightfor-
ward Mineral Park extension of physical impossibility had become the basis for judicial
thinking about impracticability, we would now have a body of case law establishing parameters
of quantitative impracticability and a set of guidelines more useful than the simple statement
that a doubling of cost is insufficient and a tenfold increase is sufficient.
Sheldon W. Halpern, Application of the Doctrine of Commercial Impracticability: Searching for "The
Wisdom of Solomon", 135 U. PENN. L. REv. 1123, 1134, n.45 (1987). "mhe commercial impracti-
cability doctrine is recognized, but rarely allowed as an excuse for nonperformance." McGinnis v.
Cayton, 312 S.E.2d 765, 775 (W. Va. 1984) (Harshbarger, J., concurring). Professor Halpern further
asserts:
[q]uantification predicated on the entire transactional context and all of the consequences of
performance seems particularly consistent with fairness.... If, however, one abandons the
bifurcation of impracticability into the elements of quantifiable loss and foreseeability, one can
develop a qualitative analysis predicated upon 'how different' instead of 'how much' is perform-
ance that can serve as an integrating factor in resolving the excuse dispute.
Halpern, supra note 275, at 1137-8. Professor Halpern goes on to state "Such a qualitative approach
is hinted at in Asphalt Int'l, Inc. v. Enterprise Shipping Corp., 667 F.2d 261 (2d Cir. 1981). The
court tried to determine whether, under the circumstances, performance would be 'essentially differ-
ent from that for which [the parties] contracted... [or whether the event] ... alter[ed] the essential
nature of the contract." Halpern, supra note 275, (quoting Asphalt Int'l, 667 F.2d at 266 (2d Cir.
1981)).
276 As of 1987, Brazil with $114.5 billion, Mexico with $105 billion and Argentina with $49.4
billion had the highest levels of external indebtedness. The South-East Asian group had the second
greatest indebtedness.
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Africa's external debt in 1988 was approximately $200 billion with
annual debt-servicing requirements of about $25 billion.277 The massive
burden of this debt and the conditions imposed by lenders have had a
substantial negative impact on living conditions in the debtor coun-
tries.278 Attempts by the borrower governments to repay the debt mean
less money to spend on public health and development of basic infra-
structure. Devaluation of currency means less buying power for citizens.
For populations already living in abject poverty, the results can include
increased malnutrition and infant mortality.
The hardship of debt and austerity programs generally falls on those
least able to pay.2 7 9 As Makgetla states: "In this context, the austerity
programs endorsed by the Western banks and their governments worked
to support those who sought to place a disproportionate share of the re-
payment burden on the poor. "280
3. Foreseeability
The "basic assumption" rubric in the doctrine of impracticability
has sometimes been interpreted as a tacit requirement that the circum-
stance on which excuse would be based must be supervening and unfore-
seen. 281 This requirement is surely met here, for neither the lenders nor
the sub-Saharan government borrowers were aware that years of
drought, civil wars and overwhelming international events such as the oil
crises and the end of the cold war, would effectively destroy the debtors'
ability to repay the loans.
The 1970s were bad times economically for nearly all sub-Saharan
277 Yacob Haile-Mariam, Legal and Other Justifications for Writing-off the Debts of the Poor
Third World Countries: The Case of Africa South of the Sahara, 24 J. WORLD TRADE 57, 59, n. 10;
see Jane Perlez, US. Forgives Portion of Kenya's Loan Debt, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 10, 1990, at D2.
278 "... . in virtually all cases, the impact of these programmes on African countries has been
basically negative. They have resulted in massive unemployment, falling real incomes, pernicious
inflation, increased imports with persistent trade deficits, net outflow of capital, mounting external
debts, denial of basic needs, severe hardships and de-industrialization." Onimode, supra note 10, at
191.
279 Id. at 599-611. "[IThe available information suggests that in most Third World countries the
top ten percent of income earners enjoys between one-third and two-fifths of national income." Id.
at 602. This disproportionate income distribution also unbalanced national production. "A dispro-
portionate share of domestic output satisfies the demand of the small high-income group for rela-
tively sophisticated consumer goods." Instead of broadening the manufacturing base for domestic
consumption and export, this concentration of economic power fixes production on sophisticated
consumer goods. Id. at 603.
280 Id. at 599.
281 If the ... burden was a wholly unforeseeable one at the inception of the term or was so remote
as to be of minimal importance, this would suggest that non-occurrence of such a burden was a
'basic assumption' within the meaning of the Restatement. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON-
TRACTS, at 311 (1979).
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African countries, principally because of oil price increases and world
recession.2 82  The 1974 world recession brought multiple economic
problems to the non-oil producing countries in developing Africa.283
The decline in world trade in 1975 had a severe impact on the balance of
payments position of most non-oil producing developing countries.284
The slow-down of growth from 1973 to 1975 seriously hurt the develop-
ment plans of sub-Saharan African countries.28 5 Developmental aid to
Africa from all sources fell 20% between 1970 and 1974.286 This is when
the heavy borrowing began, but the "proportion of external capital re-
sources directed to investment declined in favor of balance of payments
financing. ' 287  This pattern of increased borrowing to repay debts re-
mains the central feature of the debt crisis.
As developed countries began to recover from the economic crises of
the early 1970s, the rate of inflation began to rise.288 In 1976, the inter-
national financial community started to sense trouble. The IMF began to
auction off gold reserves to establish a trust fund to help the neediest
developing countries with their balance of payments problems.28 9 Also
in 1976, the Executive Committee of the Economic Commission for Af-
rica began to move away from development policies aimed at increasing
production of one or two major agricultural products for export, diversi-
282 FIELDHOUSE, supra note 127, at 104. "Africa's imports of petroleum products in 1974 cost
nearly three times as much as in 1973 and it has been estimated that 33 non-oil producing developing
countries [had] to spend [$1.3 billion] on their petroleum in 1974 compared with [$500 million] in
1973." AEI 1973 at 30.
283 Survey of Economic and Social Conditions in Africa 1976: Third Biennial Review and Ap-
praisal of Social and Economic Performance in ECA Region in the Second United States Develop-
ment Decade 5, United Nations (1976) [hereinafter "ECA 1976"].
284 ECA 1976 at 5. In 1976, of the 47 countries most seriously affected by the external debt crisis,
25 were sub-Saharan African countries. Id. at 28.
285 From 1974 to 1976, 18 non-oil exporting sub-Saharan countries with per capita GDP below
$100 had an average GDP growth rate of 2.5%, and 12 non-oil exporting sub-Saharan countries
with per capita GDP between $100 and $200, had an average GDP growth rate of -1.1%. Six
countries with per capita GDP of over $300 in 1976, had an average GDP growth rate of 6.7%.
Mineral exporting countries such as Zaire and Zambia who had relied on the copper marker were
hardest hit. Survey of Economic and Social Conditions in Africa 1976-1977 at 2, United Nations
(N.Y. 1978) [hereinafter "ECA 1977"].
286 ECA 1976 at 18-19.
287 ECA 1976 at 22, quoting 1975 Report of the Development Assistance Committee.
288 Id. at 6. Sub-Saharan African economies remained dependent on Western markets which
took 82% of all exports in 1969 and 79% in 1979. FIELDHOUSE, supra note 139, at 105. In addi-
tion, African exporters faced protectionist tariffs in Western markets. Id Africa's share of world
trade dropped by one half, from 18 to 9.2%, between 1960 and 1978. Id Between 1970 and 1974,
developing Africa's external debt grew at an annual rate of 21.9%. ECA 1976 at 2.
289 ECA 1976 at 12-12. In 1965, Zaire's balance of trade was $14.6 million. AEI 1975, Table XI.
By 1975, Zaire's balance of trade had fallen to -$297.1 million. Mozambique's balance of trade for
1965 was -$65.2 million and fell to -$255.0 million by 1975. For the same periods, Zambia's balance
of trade fell from $191.1 million to -$234.5 million. AEI 1975, Table XI.
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fication of agricultural exports, and import substitution, to policies aimed
at establishing self-sustaining socio-economic systems less dependent on
external trade.29 °
Despite some minor growth in the mid-1980s, almost all sub-
Saharan economies declined in virtually every measurable way during
the 1970s and early 1980s. 2 9 1 From 1981 to 1986, sub-Saharan Africa
again experienced widespread drought.2 9 2 The economic decline of sub-
Saharan economies was also exacerbated by external factors such as ad-
verse movements in terms of trade, declines in foreign aid and invest-
ment, as well as internal factors such as poor soils, poor human293 and
physical infrastructure, rapid urbanization and population growth, and
inappropriate public policies.2 94
Ironically, the apparent world wide collapse of communism will
probably, at least in the short term, further exacerbate the crisis by elimi-
nating sub-Saharan Africa's geopolitical role in the cold war. The East-
West tension of the post WWII period gave both the United States and
the Soviet Union reasons to provide substantial financial support to cer-
tain countries in sub-Saharan Africa. Some of this money was squan-
dered or simply stolen by incompetent and/or corrupt officials and, in
any event, it was not generally intended to benefit Africans. 295 Neverthe-
less, even if only inadvertently, U.S. and Soviet aid to Africa improved
290 Id. at 15.
291 DONALD L. SPARKS, Economic Trends in Africa South of the Sahara, 1988, in AFRICA SOUTH
OF THE SAHARA 1989 25 (1989).
292 Id.
293 Among the relevant demographic issues is the extremely high dependency ratio in sub-
Saharan Africa. AEI 1970 at 17. The economically productive age group in a given society is gener-
ally assumed to be 15 to 59. Developing Africa's 1970 population was about 340 million with a
growth rate of about 2.5%. Id. In 1970 there were approximately 42 African countries in which at
least 40% of the total population was under 14 years old. Id. "A young population is normally
associated with a high population growth rate .... Thus the number of older persons "still active
enough to supply much accumulated experience is relatively small." Id
In 1970, less than 50% of the primary school-aged children in 35 African countries were attend-
ing school. In 20 of these countries the figure was less than 25%, and in five of these countries, fewer
than 5% of the children were attending school. Id at 20. This was after developing Africa had
made significant progress in education since independence.
In 1960, there were 19.2 million primary school students, 2.0 million at secondary schools and
219,000 in higher education in sub-Saharan Africa. Id. By 1970, the totals had increased to 29.0
million in primary, 4.6 million in secondary and 360,000 in higher education. Id.
294 Id
295 "The allocation of U.S. support for economic development is now weighted heavily in favor of
security assistance.., much of the security assistance goes to developed nations, and even that given
to lesser developed countries.., is not intended to support self-sustaining growth." E. Boyd Wen-
nergren, U.S. Foreign Assistance and World Poverty: A Forgotten Commitment, 25 J. DEVELOPING
AREAS 169, 170 (1991); see also, generally, W. Raymond Duncan & Carolyn M. Ekedahl, Moscow
AND THE THIRD WORLD UNDER GORBECHAV 167-190 (1990).
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the lots of some Africans. With the end of the cold war, however, Soviet
aid has abruptly ended, and U.S. aid has, no less abruptly, slowed to a
trickle.2 9 6
These economic and political developments thus meet the rigid "su-
pervening and unforeseeable" standard of the impracticability doctrine
even at its most conservative.
This restrictive version of the impracticability doctrine, however,
has been widely criticized.29 7 Noted contracts scholar E. Allan Farns-
worth asserts that "there is no reason why a party should not also be
excused on the ground of impracticability or frustration existing at the
time of the agreement... 298 and, further, that "[e]xcuse on the ground
of existing, as opposed to supervening, impracticability, is well recog-
nized."29 9 Such an approach effectively eliminates the distinction be-
tween the doctrine of impracticability and the doctrine of mutual
mistake. Unlike impracticability, however, excuse based on mutual mis-
take requires only that the mistake had a "material effect" on the agreed
performances. 3°
D. Mutual Mistake
The doctrine of mutual mistake provides generally that when parties
enter an agreement under one or more assumptions that are both shared
and false, the agreement may be avoided, unless the risk is otherwise
allocated by agreement, custom or law.30 1 Perhaps because excuse based
296 "On the day that U.S. President George Bush reiterated to Congress the urgency of approv-
ing some $800 million in cash assistance to Panama and Nicaragua to consolidate 'democratic' gains,
Secretary of State James Baker celebrated the birth of the world's newest democracy by announcing
plans to provide Namibia with $500,000 this year . . . Washington's meager contribution to
Namibia's future is emblematic of a clear trend in U.S assistance to sub-Saharan Africa - it is
falling." Jim Lobe, Africa: Lower Priority, Lower Aid Dollars for U.S., INTER PRESS SERVICE, Mar.
20, 1990. "Once Zaire was an anti-communist bulwark. Last year, as communism collapsed and the
conflict in neighboring Angola lost its sting, America restricted aid. This year it froze aid." Zaire:
The Descent to Darkness, ECONOMIST, Oct. 19, 1991, at 47. See also, Remembering Africa, supra
note 6, at 33.
297 "The requirement of absolute non-foreseability as a condition to the application of the doc-
trine would be so logically inconsistent that in effect it would nullify the doctrine.. ." 529 F. Supp.
826 (dist. date). [To require a complete absence of foreseeability would] "practically destroy the
doctrine of supervening impossibility, notwithstanding its present wide and apparently growing pop-
ularity." L.N. Jackson & Co v. Royal Norwegian Gov't, 177 F.2d 694, 699 (2d Cir. 1949). "[B]oth
the Code and the Restatement have specifically rejected the test of foreseeability as the only standard
by which to measure impracticability...." Paula Walter, Commercial Impracticability in Contracts,
61 ST. JoHN's L. REV. 225, 237 (1987).
298 FARNsWORTH, supra note 225, at 53.
299 Id.
300 Guthrie v. Times Mirror Co., 51 Cal. App. 3d 879 (1975).
301 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS, §§ 152, 154; CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CON-
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 13:258(1992)
on mutual mistake requires only a showing that the mistake had a mate-
rial effect on the agreed performance, availability of the doctrine is lim-
ited in two important ways. First, the mistake must relate to a fact
existing when the contract is made.3 2 Second, as compared with im-
practicability, it is said to be more likely that one of the parties will be
deemed to have borne the risk in a case involving a claim of mutual mis-
take.303 These limitations have been seriously questioned, however, by at
least one court. In the 1980 case Aluminum Company of America v. Es-
sex Group ("ALCOA"),3" a United States District court used the doc-
trine of mutual mistake to reform and equitably adjust a long term
contract.
L The ALCOA Case
ALCOA involved a long term service contract under which the alu-
minum company was to convert alumina into molten aluminum for Es-
sex Group. The contract included a flexible price provision with an
escalator clause tied, in part, to the federal government's Wholesale Price
Index ("WPI"). The parties expected that fluctuations in the WPI would
accurately reflect fluctuations in Alcoa's non-labor costs and, thus, pro-
vide an independent and objective standard by which contract price
could be adjusted from time to time.
Less than half way into the contract's sixteen year term, it became
clear that the WPI-based formula was not working as intended. ALCOA
experienced cost increases not adequately reflected by corresponding pro-
portional increases in the WPI. As a result, ALCOA stood to lose more
than $60 million out of pocket during the remaining term of the contract.
ALCOA brought suit, based, in part, on mutual mistake and seeking re-
form or equitable adjustment of its agreement with Essex Group.
The United States District Court quickly dismissed an argument by
Essex that because it had sought only to protect its own interests when
the contract was negotiated, it could not be a party to any mistake con-
TRACTS, § 9-26, at 379. The doctrine of mutual mistake operat- to excuse performance of obliga-
tions under contracts entered into by parties who shared a common misconception regarding a basic
assumption upon which the contract was based. The same rule holds if the parties are operating
under differing mistakes about the same vital fact. It is immaterial whether the mistake relates to
factors traditionally stressed as most likely to be vital such as to the identity of the subject matter.
The important thing is that it be a basic assumption upon which both parties acted. CALAMARI AND
PERILLO ON CONTRACTS § 9-26; see also United States v. Garland 122 F.2d 118 (4th Cir. 1941),
cert. denied, 314 U.S. 685 (1941). Compare Allen v. Hammond, 36 U.S. (1 Pet.) 63 (1837); Hitt v.
Cox, 737 F.2d 421, 424 (4th Cir. 1984).
302 Dover Pool & Raquet Club v. Brooking, 322 N.E.2d 168 (Mass. 1975).
303 Handicapped Children's Education Board v. Lukaszewski, 332 N.W.2d 774 (Wis. 1983).
304 499 F. Supp. 53 (W.D. Pa. 1980).
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cerning the extent to which the WPI-based formula would effectively
protect Alcoa's interests. 305 The court stated that "[w]hile [Essex] did
not share the motive to protect ALCOA, [Essex] understood the func-
tional purposes of the agreement. [Essex] therefore shared this mistake
of fact."306 The court then distinguished cases in which one party "as-
sumed or bore the risk,, 30 7 and went on to state:
where parties enter a contract in a state of conscious ignorance of the facts,
they are deemed to risk the burden of having the facts turn out to be ad-
verse, within very broad limits.... If, by contrast, the parties both mistak-
enly believe [a "fact" that later proves untrue], the case is said not to be one
of conscious ignorance but one of mutual mistake.30 8
The loans made to sub-Saharan debtor nations, like all true loans,
were made based on the shared assumption that repayment could and
would occur. Subsequent developments have proved this assumption
false. Under the doctrine of mutual mistake, however, the question is
whether the assumption of future ability to repay was false at the time it
was made. In other words, have these subsequent developments ren-
dered the assumption invalid, or have they merely demonstrated that the
assumption was invalid ab initio? The theory of structural dependency
suggests that the latter is the case.
2. Structural Dependency Theory
Some commentators have explained the third world debt crisis in
terms of a relational analysis that has come to be known as structural
dependency theory. This view is not mutually exclusive - or even in-
consistent - with the widely accepted "oil shock" attribution outlined in
Part II above. Structural dependency theory, however, is much broader
and decidedly more pessimistic, suggesting that the hierarchal relation-
ship between the developed and developing worlds is permanent and that
the economic gap between the two must inevitably grow. Professor John
Baloro's view is representative: 0 9
305 Alcoa, 499 F.Supp. 53, 64 (W.D. Pa. 1980).
306 Id.
307 Id. at 66-67.
308 Id. at 68. Additionally, although the contract included a detailed and specifically negotiated
force majeur provision intended to protect ALCOA, the court declined the invitation to employ the
principle of construction expressed in the maxim "expresslo unius est exclusio alterius." Id.
309 "Dependency theory" is the shorthand description of a large and well established body of
economic/political literature addressing the relationship between the LDCs and the Western indus-
trialized countries. See, eg., FERNANDO H. CARDozo & ENZO FALETrO, DEPENDENCY AND DE-
VELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA (Majory M. Urquidi trans., 1979); J. Samuel Valenzuela and
Arturo Valenzuela, Modernization and Dependency: Alternative Perspectives in the Study of Latin
American Development, 10 COMP. PoL. 535-57 (1978); and ANDRE GUNDER FRANK, DEPENDENT
ACCUMULATION AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT (1979).
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[T]he nature and background of the debt problem clearly antedates the "oil
crisis.". . .The character of the economic relationship [between the LDC's
and the Western industrialized countries] ... has been defined by an inter-
national division of labor which has served to condemn the developing
countries into the role of producers of industrial raw materials for the in-
dustries of Western Europe and North America.... In an ordinary situa-
tion of balanced trade and exchange, there would be nothing wrong with
[this].... However, from the time of colonial encounter to this day, the
relationship has worked itself into an utterly lopsided one... the prices of
the exports of the primary producers are not determined by them but are
unilaterally fixed by the buyers.a l  .. .On the other hand, Third World
consumers of [manufactured] products have virtually no influence over
their pricing.... [The long-term payment deficits of these countries...
have been caused by the unjust terms of trade existing between them and
the industrialized world.... [T]he debt problem is merely the superstruc-
tural symptom of this unbalanced relationship. a "
Simply put, structural dependency theory suggests that the factors
rendering performance impossible were, though perhaps unknown to the
parties, present from the outset. If export earnings lag behind import
expenditures, and the gap inevitably grows, there is no realistic (or even
theoretical) "way out" for the LDCs. To appreciate the debt-specific
ramifications of this view, one must understand, inter alia, the concepts
of "net transfer" and "debt service ratio." "Net transfer" is the differ-
ence between the gross amount of new loan money flowing into a debtor
country and the cumulative foreign "debt service" obligation of that
country (including principal and interest).3 1 1 "Debt service ratio" is the
ratio, expressed as a percentage, of debt service (as defined immediately
above) to export earnings.3 1 3 Each of these measures compares income
from a different source (one borrowed, the other earned) to the accumu-
lated cost of borrowing to date. A negative net transfer is good for a
debtor country only if that country is successfully reducing its principal
indebtedness and is able to fund the negative transfer from export earn-
ings without undermining its development program or injuring the living
standard of its people. No country in sub-Saharan Africa has been, or is
now, able to do this.3 14
United Nations studies indicate that the net transfer into sub-
310 "In 1985, 81% of [sub-Saharan] Africa's exports went to the Western industrialized countries
(with the USA being the largest consumer). In the same period [sub-Saharan] Africa bought about
the same proportion of its imports from these countries (with France the largest supplier)." Sparks,
supra note 291, at 25.
311 Baloro, supra note 159, at 141-2.
312 Cheryl Payer, Causes of the Debt Crisis, in THE IMF, THE WORLD BANK AND THE AFRICAN
Dar, supra note 10, at 7, 8.
313 Id. at 9.
314 See infra Part IVB.
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Saharan Africa in 1978 was about 20 billion dollars; by 1985 it had fallen
to a rate of three billion dollars annually, and by the end of 1986 net
transfer had turned negative.31 Thus, although the trend had been as-
certainable for many years, in 1986 it became graphically clear that sub-
Saharan Africa's sovereign loan obligations exceeded - and were grow-
ing faster than - loan income.316 At about the same time, the Organiza-
tion of African Unity ("OAU") estimated that debt service was
consuming about 40% of sub-Saharan Africa's export earnings.3 17 For
many individual African countries, the debt service ratio was already far
higher than 40%.318 The crisis is almost certainly beyond the control of
the LDC debtors. One commentator explained:
Central to most dependency approaches to the political economy of devel-
opment and underdevelopment is the notion that LDC's are inordinately
vulnerable to events, processes, and forces that originate in the capitalist
world economy... the economies of less-developed countries are structur-
ally conditioned by the nature of their linkage to the international political
economy. Typically, the international division of labor is one in which the
LDC's export raw materials at relatively cheap prices to the countries of the
industrial core, which convert these materials into finished goods and sell
them to the LDC's at comparatively high cost. Such unequal terms of
trade, in turn, produce serious balance of payments difficulties... [it has
been] estimated that more than 80% of the increase in LDC external debt
from 1973 to 1982 can be attributed entirely to the influence of external
factors. 31
9
As a general rule, the higher the level of development, the lower the
ratio of primary activity, and the higher the ratio of manufacturing activ-
ity, to total production.320 Agriculture is the largest single contributor to
most African economies, accounting for an average of 39% of GDP.32'
315 Baloro, supra note 159, at 142.
316 If dependency theory is right, and the reversal of net transfer is an inevitable tendency, one
would expect the International Monetary Fund would (1) understand, and (2) - not being profit-
motivated - resist this phenomenon. But "[e]ven the IMF... received approximately $4.5 billion
dollars more in interest charges and repayments than it extended in new credit in 1986." Garg,
supra note 4, at 47.
317 Baloro, supra note 159, at 142.
318 The OAU's estimates of individual countries' debt service ratios for 1987 include the follow-
ing: Sudan 204%; Zambia 100%; Madagascar 87%; Togo 54%; Ghana, Malawi and Uganda 50%.
Id.
319 William P. Avery, The Origins of Debt Accumulation Among LDC's in the World Political
Economy, 24 J. DEv. AREAS 503, 506-507 (1990). Most countries of sub-Saharan Africa depend on
one or two commodities for 70% or more of their export earnings. Remembering Africa, supra note
6, at 33.
320 AEI 1968 at 21.
321 Between 1960 and 1970, agriculture's real rate of growth was only 2.2%. In 1960, manufac-
turing contributed 11% to Africa's GDP. By 1970, manufacturing accounted for 17% of Africa's
GDP. AEI 1970 at 14, 24.
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In countries where agriculture is not dominant, mining is of special im-
portance.322 The disproportionate role of the two primary activities of
agriculture and mining explains the low level of productivity in sub-
Saharan Africa.323 The Structural Adjustment and Economic Recovery
Programs of the IMF and the World Bank have not effectively ad-
dressed, or even confronted, the problems inherent in this set of interna-
tional economic relationships. Some analysts suggest that the IMF/
World Bank programs and the often identical conditions required (i.e.,
effectively imposed) by commercial lenders have only exacerbated the
problem. 324
Some observers see the debt crisis as symptomatic of "a fundamental
contradiction in U.S. economic policy toward the Third World. ''325 Dr.
Cheryl Payer contends that, contrary to basic capitalist economic theory,
private investment capital has not generally flowed into the capital
starved LDCs. This void was filled, in significant part, by United States
foreign aid programs which were begun in the 1950s "as a means of sup-
porting anti-communist governments in the Middle East and in Asia."'326
322 In 1960, mining contributed 4% to GDP. This proportion grew to 16.8% of GDP by 1970.
AEI 1970 at 11.
Principal export product revenues as a percentage of overall export
earnings (average for 1980-1982)
Uganda (coffee) 96 Madagascar (coffee) 47
Burundi (coffee) 90 Mali (cotton) 46
Zambia (copper) 89 Zaire (copper) 43
Rwanda (coffee) 68 Burkina Faso (cotton) 40
Ethiopia (coffee) 65 Sudan (cotton) 39
Ghana (cocoa) 59
Source: Amex Bank (1983), quoted in International Debt Restructuring, Substantive Issues and Tech-
niques, supra note 14, at 7.
323 Id. In 1970, only five commodities accounted for 60.9% of all exports from developing Af-
rica: crude petroleum, copper, coffee beans, raw cotton, and cocoa beans, with crude petroleum
representing 30.9% of total exports. Id at 21. Only a few sub-Saharan countries have oil exports;
most rely on the latter four. In 1970, 95.3% of Zambia's export earnings and over 65% of Zaire's
export earnings came from copper. Id at 26. Coffee and cocoa represented over 50% of Cote
D'Ivorie's exports in 1970. Id at 23, tables. A falling international market for such commodities
would be disastrous for the balance of payments of any "one crop" economy. Id at 26.
324 "On the global scale, the overall impact of Fund and Bank policies and programmes has been
the strengthening of the international capitalist division of labour with a widening of the gap between
rich and poor countries and the increasing external dependence of the Third World." Onimode,
supra note 10, at 192.
325 Payer, supra note 312, at 7.
326 Id. at 8. In his 1949 inaugural address, President Truman declared that:
we must embark on a bold new program for making the benefits of our scientific advances and
industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas.... I
believe that we should make available to peace-loving peoples the benefits of our store of techni-
cal knowledge in order to help them realize their aspirations for a better life.
E. Boyd Wernergren, U.S. Foreign assistance and World Poverty: A Forgotten Commitment, 25 J.
DEVELOPING AREAS 169 (1991).
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Subsequent loans to the LDCs are an outgrowth of those aid programs
but must, by definition, eventually reverse the flow of capital so that, in
the end, the money is flowing out of the LDCs.a27
The original loans were made based on the shared assumption that
the economies of the debtor nations would grow at a relatively consistent
rate, and that those nations, once endowed with financial support, would
blossom into economic stability. This mutual assumption was pro-
foundly mistaken. As structural dependency theory helps to demon-
strate, repayment of the loans did not merely become impossible; it was
impossible from the outset.
Sub-Saharan Africa's external, sovereign debt thus arose out of mu-
tually mistaken assumptions, and if repayment is impracticable due to
both existing circumstances and supervening developments, the question
remains: what is to be done? Put differently, if objective impossibility of
repayment is a fact of which judicial notice should be taken, how should
fundamental adjustment - amounting to substantial discharge - of the
debt be accomplished? The answer may lie in the discretionary judicial
device of equitable adjustment.
E. Equitable Adjustment
In contrast to the all-or-nothing nature of contractual excuse doc-
trines as traditionally applied, 28 an increasing number of commentators
have taken the position that contracts found to be unconscionable or
based on mutual mistake, or whose performance has become impractica-
ble, should be judicially modified.32 9 This approach is often called equi-
table adjustment and has been described thusly:
327 Payer, supra note 312, at 7-8.
328 See supra Part VI, Section A.
329 Equitable adjustment is perhaps best understood in the context of the relational approach to
contracts. Professor Sheldon W. Halpern summarizes the relational approach as follows:
The contract is a skeleton-like structure upon which the relationship is built, intended to do
little more than describe the general policy governing the relationship. Under this view, when a
supervening event renders a party's performance impracticable, fairness within the context of
the relationship may require a sharing of the consequential losses between the parties. It is not
unreasonable to posit an unarticulated 'duty to adjust' (footnotes omitted).
Halpern, supra note 275, at 1129.
Professor Ian RL Macneil describes the rationale for this approach:
Somewhere along the line of increasing duration and complexity, trying to force changes into a
pattern of original consent becomes both too difficult and too unrewarding to justify the effort,
and the contractual relation escapes the bounds of the neoclassical system. That system is re-
placed by very different adjustment processes of an on-going administrative kind.... This
includes internal and external dispute resolution structures. At this point, the relation has be-
come a mini-society with a vast array of norms beyond the norms centered on exchange and its
immediate processes.
Ian R. Macneil, Contracts Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations under Classical, Neoclassi-
cal and Relational Law, 72 Nw. U. L. REv. 854, 901 (1978).
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Rather than simply allowing avoidance of performance, some have pro-
posed a more flexible right to withhold performance pending modification
of the original contract to reflect a sharing of the benefits and burdens gen-
erated by the disruptive event. Although the arguments for excuse and
modification may differ, the thrust of each is the same: the law ought to
require the advantaged party to adjust the original agreement.3 30
To date, only ALCOA has embraced this approach wholeheart-
edly, 331 but the ALCOA court made it clear that it did not consider its
action to be of a sort that should be reserved for extraordinary circum-
stances. "The question of defining the risks ALCOA assumed is one of
interpretation. It implicates no strong public policy. '332 If, as suggested
below, the sub-Saharan debt crisis implicates strong considerations of
public policy, the case for equitable adjustment is even stronger than it
was in ALCOA.
ALCOA and the doctrine of equitable adjustment have been written
about extensively and are not without contrary authority and commen-
tary.333 Professor Clayton P. Gillette's view is representative and well
articulated. In an article opposing adjustment, written five years before
the ALCOA decision, Professor Gillette states his position thusly:
If a commercial actor is able to bargain with uncertainty in mind, I suggest
the law ought to consider a such [sic] bargain the product of a cognitive and
analytical process for which the actor can be held accountable, notwith-
standing the intervention of specific events that the actor did not pre-
dict. . . . I therefore reject recent commentary that views contract
necessarily as a communitarian exercise and instead adopt a conception of
contract as a mechanism for individual expression by commercial actors
330 Clayton P. Gillette, Commercial Rationality and the Duty to Adjust Long-Term Contracts, 69
MiNN. L. REv. 521, 522 (1985)(footnotes omitted).
331 The court also helped to erode the somewhat artificial distinctions among the excuse doc-
trines. Even after acknowledging that the aluminum company had, to date, made a net profit of nine
million dollars on the contract, the court stated that - based on the projected cost of complete
performance by ALCOA - "if this case required a determination of the conscionability of enforcing
this contract in the current circumstances, the Court would not hesitate to hold it unconscionable."
Aluminum Company of America v. Essex Group, 499 F.Supp. 53, 66 (W.D. Pa. 1980). The quoted
passage clearly implies both that equitable adjustment does not require a determination of uncon-
scionability and that such a determination, if necessary, could be based on post-execution develop-
ments demonstrating a mutually mistaken assumption in contract formation.
The court was not deterred from equitably adjusting the contract by the possibility of continu-
ing involvement in the relationship of the parties. "Since the effect of this decision is to modify the
contract but to keep it in force, both parties may be adequately protected against severe and surpris-
ing economic developments. Each continues to have recourse to the courts." Idk at 66, n.7. The
District Court's decision never took effect, however, because the case was settled. "The parties rene-
gotiated their arrangement.... The decision plus the appellate process worked as a form of coercive
mediation." Stewart MacCaulay, An Empircal View of Contract, 1985 Wis. L. REv. 465, 476 (1985).
332 ALCOA, 499 F.Supp. at 69.
333 See, e.g., John P. Dawson, Judicial Revision of Frustrated Conracts" the United States, 64
B.U.L. REv. 1, 28 (1984); Leasco v. Taussig, 473 F.2d 777 (2d Cir. 1972).
Contractual Bases for Adjusting Aftcan Debt
13:258(1992)
capable of considering and bearing the consequences of reasoned choice.334
This, of course, is no more than old fashioned pacta sunt servanda and
caveat emptor. But Professor Gillette goes on to develop a "nonadjust-
ment model" that he says rests on three assumptions.335 The first is
"that the contract does not impose significant costs on non parties, that
is, that there are minimal externalities. '336 The second assumption is
that both parties to the contract are "self-interested actors. '337 The third
assumption is that, in negotiating the contract, each party will consider
each term to be a matter of either certainty, risk or uncertainty.338 But a
critical fourth assumption is revealed later: "[t]he nonadjustment model
assumes that each party to a contract has dickered about terms to the
extent necessary to serve his self-interest. 339
The first, third and fourth of Professor Gillette's assumptions are
simply inaccurate as applied to the agreements underlying sub-Saharan
Africa's debt, and, because the second assumption has meaning only in
connection with the fourth, it too is inapplicable.
Criticisms of equitable adjustment are most persuasive when applied
to arm's length market transactions in which the parties have meaningful
alternatives. Professor Gillette's "hard ball" approach is particularly in-
appropriate, however, when massive externalities and major issues of
public policy are present, as with the third world debt crisis in general,
and sub-Saharan Africa's debt crisis in particular.
In theory, the governments of sub-Saharan Africa's debtor countries
are the representatives and agents of their respective populations, and
sub-Saharan Africa's massive external debt was incurred to advance the
interests of the people of the debtor countries. In fact, for reasons includ-
ing, but not limited to, government incompetence and corruption, it is
simply absurd to conclude that the suffering masses in sub-Saharan Af-
rica "assumed the risk." These populations are innocent third-party vic-
tims of agreements between lenders and debtor country governments.
Their suffering is an "externality" that should not be ignored.
334 Gillette, supra note 330, at 524. Specifically criticizing equitable adjustment, Professor Gil-
lette goes on to say that:
This invocation of law to require adjustment between the parties to relational contracts rests on
two often unstated assumptions: first, that opportunism will cause an undesirable breakdown of
the relationship in the absence of constraints and, second, that uncertainty prevents the parties
from providing the necessary constraints at the negotiation stage.
Id. at 556. Professor Gillette's implication is that either or both of these assumptions are often
untrue. As regards sub-Saharan African debt, however, both are accurate.
335 Id. at 527.
336 Id.
337 Id. at 528.
338 Id. at 529, 530.
339 Id. at 552.
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It is also in the political and economic self-interest of the United
States and other developed countries to seek solution of the LDC debt
crisis. In a 1992 speech to the United Nations Conference on Interna-
tional Trade and Development, IMF Managing Director Michael
Camdessus said:
The momentous changes in the political and economic framework are
bringing new opportunities, but these are accompanied by many risks...
the risks are immediate. They are with us now and they are pressing. Some
of these risks are sufficiently serious that they could prevent us from reaping
the potentially rich harvest of our efforts... the next few years, therefore,
will be a time of great risks - risks that "adjustment fatigue" may be
matched by "donor fatigue," and risks of all possible kinds of vicious cy-
cles, as failure in one area might contribute to failure in another.
340
As briefly outlined in the Introduction to this article, the economic
situation in most sub-Saharan African countries is bad, and in many it is
rapidly deteriorating. In many cases, the result has been worsening liv-
ing conditions for those already worst off, as the burden of economic
hardship is shifted inevitably to those unable to resist its imposition. 41
A growing gap between the "haves" and the "have nots," combined with
an absence of any realistic prospect of upward mobility, is a tremen-
dously destabilizing factor in any society.3 42
In many sub-Saharan African countries, therefore, there is consider-
able internal pressure for substantive political and economic change. A
recent report in The Economist put it bluntly: "After 30 years of rule by
thieves and autocrats, Africans are saying 'enough.' ,343 Because com-
mand-style central planning has been abruptly discredited at the interna-
tional level, and its African adaptations have uniformly failed to produce
meaningful economic growth, the current socio-political firmament rep-
resents an historic opportunity to encourage broad scale democratic
reforms.344
340 Michel Camdessus, speaking to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
VIII in Cartegena, Columbia, February 11, 1992, reported in IMF Survey, Feb. 17, 1992, at 60-61.
341 In Zaire, for example, "Parliament, its members well supplied with houses, cars, lucrative
contracts and outright bribes, is supine before the presidential whim. Frightful, and worsening,
poverty has fuelled uncontainable discontent. Corruption on a heroic scale has made economic dis-
aster inevitable ..... Descent to Darkness, supra note 296, at 47.
342 See, eg., Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, 251-257 (1968).
343 Africa's New Drumbeat, ECONOMIST, June 22, 1991, at 46.
344 In Zambia, for example, the staple food, maize, is scarce. "Most Zambians buy it on the black
market; in towns they pay double the official price, in rural areas (where they are poorer still) they
pay at least four times that. Townspeople are tempted to riot, as they did when the government tried
to raise the price in June 1990. Country people will just go short. The blame lies not with the usual
African troika of war, pestilence and drought, but with the command economics .. " Zambia: Out
of the Maize, ECONOMIST, Oct. 5, 1991, at 44.
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Zambia, for example, in 1991 scheduled the first multi-party elec-
tions to be held there since that country won independence in 1964. Pres-
ident Kenneth Kaunda's United National Independence Party
("UNIP") had been in power since then and had been the only author-
ized political party since 1972.345 As the election approached, The Econ-
omist reported that, due primarily to deteriorating living conditions in
Zambia, UNIP was expected to lose to a broad based coalition called the
Movement for Multi-party Democracy ("MMD"):
The opposition's advantage is that the government has for a decade failed to
stop people getting poorer. The roads have decayed. Most hospitals are
understaffed and lack the most basic drugs. Schools have few textbooks,
desks or chairs, so that most pupils must sit on the floor. The bloated civil
service is aimless, underpaid and corrupt.34
The MMD did, indeed, win the Zambian election, and it was reported
that "[t]he new president has a mandate for change, whatever change
may be."
3 4 7
Change does not always come smoothly. In Nigerian elections held
at about the same time as those in Zambia, it was reported that "bribery
was ife... supporters of at least one candidate openly handed out 20
naira ($1) notes to anybody willing to stand in their man's voting
line.... Violence continues to march alongside the military govern-
ment's six year transition to democracy. '34
Recent developments in Kenya demonstrate the potential effective-
ness of external financial incentives where one-party government is al-
ready facing internal pressure for reform. In March, 1991, an opposition
magazine in Kenya declared that:
The time is nigh when all foreign aid agencies should pause and reevaluate
their continued economic support to this country. Earlier calls for condi-
tioning economic aid by political reform should be put into practice
now.... Foreign aid agencies should realize that without a democratic
system and provisions for multi-parties; parties that would have a strong
and effective opposition to the ruling party, the tendency is the development
of a monolithic one-party state of laxity and inefficiency. 349
345 Zambia: Revolution by Ballot, ECONOMIST, Oct. 26, 1991, at 49.
346 Id. at 49, 52.
347 Zambia: In the End, A Graceful Exit, ECONOMIST, Nov. 9, 1991, at 44. "Mr. Kaunda has
always blamed Zambia's economic collapse on external forces: the oil crisis of the mid 1970s, sanc-
tions against Ian Smith's Rhodesia, poor prices for the copper on which Zambia depends for 90% of
its foreign exchange earnings. President Chiluba points to ineptitude and corruption in Mr.
Kaunda's government, and says that Zambians themselves must revive the economy by hard work,
discipline, honesty and determination." Id.
348 Nigeria Attention, ECONOMIST, Oct. 26, 1991, at 52.
349 Mburu Wa Kiago, Of Debt Relief Accountability and Political Reforms 31, NAIROBI L.
MONTHLY 39 (1991).
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Eight months later, The New York Times reported that "[tlhe United
States and other aid-donor nations told Kenya today to introduce polit-
ical and economic reforms and improvements in human rights or face
major cuts in aid in six months. ' 350 Within a week, Kenya's only legal
political party, the Kenya African National Union, followed President
Daniel arap Moi's direction and called for legalization of rival parties,
which had been formally banned in 1982. 35'
The Kenyan example and others like it indicate that the current
combination of (1) indigenous pressure for reform and (2) the disappear-
ance of geopolitical competition between the cold war superpowers
presents an important opportunity to encourage progressive political and
economic reform. Progressive reform will help to improve living condi-
tions, 352 which in turn will help to stabilize societies. Stability will better
protect the interests of foreign lenders and investors and facilitate na-
tional economic development and international economic integration.353
Thus, it is in the self-interest of the United States and other developed
countries to aggressively pursue comprehensive solution of the LDC debt
crisis. Among the LDC debtors, sub-Saharan Africa's situation is by far
the most urgent.
VII. IMPLICATIONS OF THE CONTRACTUAL APPROACH
The contractual analysis described above suggests the following.
First, the burden of repayment has become so onerous as to perhaps
render enforcement of the loan agreements unconscionable. Second, it is
350 Steven Greenhouse, Aid Donors Insist on Kenya Reforms, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 1991, at Al.
The report went on to say that
Donor nations and international institutions like the World Bank have given Kenya about $800
million in development aid over each of the past two years - a figure equal to perhaps a third of
the Kenyan Government's annual budget ... Kenya has long been one of the largest recipients
of aid in Africa south of the Sahara because in the past the former British colony was a bright
spot for economic development and political freedom in Africa. But in recent months aid do-
nors have reconsidered their aid to Kenya as repression has grown and economic policies have
stumbled.... Over the past month, the... Government has arrested top opposition figures and
used guns and batons to break up a pro-democracy march. [Kenyan President] ... Moi and
close associates of his in the Government are widely believed to have become wealthy men over
the years.
Id.
351 Kenya: Cash Counts, EcoNoMIsT, Dee 7, 1991, at 50.
352 Among the findings and recommendations of a recent (U.S.) presidential mission regarding
"Child Survival and Aids in Sub-Saharan Africa" is the following:
Healthy economies provide the resources for healthy children. United States policy should
continue to emphasize broad-based economic growth that help create an environment in which
health programs will be sustainable and effective.
Levinson, supra note 2, at 497-503.
353 See generally, E. Wayne Nafziger, African Capitalism, State Power and Economic Develop-
ment, 28 J. MOD. AFR. STuD. 1 (1990) 141; DAvID BEVAN, ARNE BIGSTEN, ET AL., East African
Lessons on Economic Liberalization (1987).
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impossible and, a fortiori, impracticable that sub-Saharan debtor coun-
tries, many of whom are experiencing negative economic growth, can
repay their exponentially expanding external debt, even as rescheduled.
Third, the parties' shared assumptions regarding debtors' ability to repay
based on certain economic "facts" reflect a profound mutual mistake and
warrant equitable adjustment of the debt to an amount that can reason-
ably be repaid.
Perhaps the most obvious potential use for the contractual approach
described above is as a defense for debtors in a collection suit brought by
lenders. This use is unlikely, however, because there is little chance of
such a suit being brought. For official lenders, both bilateral and multi-
lateral, the loans were never viewed as pure business transactions from
which a monetary gain was expected. These lenders are guided primarily
by policy considerations that, although self-interested, are not fundamen-
tally profit-motivated. Recently, official lenders have shown increasing
awareness of the severity of the poorest debtor countries' plight. 54 It is
particularly telling that, in this context, some commentators have even
begun to use the terms "lender" and "donor" interchangeably.
355
Commercial lenders, on the other hand, are in the loan business to
make money. Indeed, if a commercial lender voluntarily forgave large
amounts of debt, its shareholders would probably have a basis for legal
action against the institution's management. Refraining from legal ac-
tion to collect the debt is quite distinct from voluntary forgiveness, how-
ever, and commercial lenders and their influential shareholders
apparently realize that such suits would almost certainly be futile. Ag-
gressive collection efforts by commercial lenders would not only be futile,
they would probably be self-destructive for reasons detailed in Part III,
Section A, above. Thus, a commercial lender would be unwise to "force
the issue" when repayment is impossible. 56
This does not mean, however, that the courts cannot become in-
volved. Just as, under certain circumstances, a severely distressed pri-
354 Despite the general history of resentment and resistance to conditionality, calls for greater
pressure for reform toward free market principles have arisen in some debtor countries. Not surpris-
ingly, some of these calls come from indigenous opponents of the status quo within debtor countries.
Quite apart from internal politics, however, "increasingly, the Bank and the IMF find their borrow-
ers running ahead of their advice in both the scope and pace of economic reform." Two Pillars of
Wisdom, supra note 169, at 5. Indeed, each side seems to be more understanding of the other's
concerns. The Economist recently reported that "past divisions over development policy are heal-
ing. Africa's old rulers are retiring, or being forced out. Governments these days accept the need for
reform. Donors have realized that Africans cannot withstand as much austerity as aid conditions
used to demand." Remembering Africa, supra note 6, at 33.
355 See Democracy in Africa Lighter Continent, ECONOMIST, Feb. 22, 1992, at 17.
356 Id.
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vate debtor can seek discharge in bankruptcy, debtor nations could seek
declaratory judgments-to the same effect based on the argument outlined
above. The many technical and/or procedural issues that would arise in
connection with such an action by a sovereign debtor are beyond the
scope of this article. In this context, mere identification of a possible
tactic by which debtors might take the initiative is sufficient to bring into
focus the simplicity of the reconceptualization this article proposes. The
approach described above would have debtors ask only to be treated like
the commercial lenders themselves would be treated under similarly se-
vere financial circumstances.
The contractual approach is not without drawbacks and bases for
criticism. First, it is arguable that sovereign bankruptcy, or its functional
equivalent, was not among the eventualities commercial lenders could
reasonably have been expected to consider when the relevant loan agree-
ments were entered into and that a solution analogous to bankruptcy is
therefore unfair.357 To the extent that this is true, however, the above
argument regarding mutual mistake is strengthened. Moreover, while
the lenders' abusive practices may not give rise to legal liability, their
central role in creating the debt crisis certainly undermines lenders' argu-
ments that their absorbing most of the resultant losses is somehow funda-
mentally unfair.
Second, it might be objected that the proposed solution subsidizes
LDC debtors at the expense of commercial lenders and their sharehold-
ers. It does. But this is also the effect of discharging the debts of private
parties through bankruptcy in the domestic context, which subsidizes
debtors at the expense of creditors and their shareholders - without ad-
vancing any public policy objective broader than a desire to allow the
bankrupt debtor to get on with his or her life.358 In this regard, it is
noteworthy that, according to one commentator's projections, significant
debt relief for all LDCs (not just sub-Saharan Africa) would cost less
than one-twentieth of the cost of the savings and loan bail out, 59 which
some experts have estimated could cost United States taxpayers more
357 See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
358 Alternatively, because society's most important public policy objectives are usually pursued
with public funds, perhaps commercial lenders should be entitled to partial reimbursement of their
LDC loan losses from public funds. This, of course, does not happen with bankruptcy, but the
resolution of this question is entirely independent of the point being made here. Perhaps more im-
portantly, such partial reimbursement from public funds now appears inevitable because "the FDIC
projects a deficit of as much as $28.9 billion in two years. Battered by bad loans to real estate
developers, takeover artists, and Third World countries, nearly 900 banks, with assets of $162 bil-
lion, have failed since 1987." How Deep is the Hole?, BUSINESS WEEK, Dec. 9, 1991, at 30.
359 Krugman, supra note 113, at 150.
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than $500 billion over the next 40 years. 360
Third, it is arguable that the approach proposed here will cause
banks to take punitive measures against debtor countries. Such measures
might include termination of new lending, cancellation of existing trade
credit lines, acceleration or "calling" of loans, or even attempts to attach
debtors' assets. These responses seem improbable for the same reasons
that commercial lenders are unlikely to sue. Their only practical hope of
realizing even partial repayment lies in maintaining a non-adversarial re-
lationship with the debtors. Also, because commercial lenders cannot be
sure that private sanctions would be uniformly applied, unilateral impo-
sition of such sanctions might only create opportunities for competitors.
Fourth, it could be claimed that the proposed approach would dan-
gerously weaken the international banking system by requiring commer-
cial lenders to write down or write off large loans now carried on their
financial statements as assets. The answer to this criticism is that loans
which cannot be repaid simply are not "assets" in any meaningful sense
of that term, and their inclusion in banks' financial statements is there-
fore not a practice that should be protected. It is not a flaw of the pro-
posed approach that it might serve to expose an existing financial crisis
and need for realignment of the international banking system. Moreover,
the proposed approach would provide a means by which the required
realignment could be regulated, pursuant to principle, by parties with no
pecuniary interest in the agreements to be modified.
Probably the most important implication of the contractual ap-
proach described above is that it affords debtor nations a principled basis
for contesting, whether in legal or purely policy fora,161 the extent of
their indebtedness. Because it seeks only to achieve the result mandated
by legal principles, equitable adjustment pursuant to contractual analysis
is not a favor or concession to debtors. It is the law. This simple but
fundamental reconceptualization of the problem could help to restore the
self-esteem of sub-Saharan debtor nations and establish their dignity in
the perception of the developed world.3 62
Finally, the proposed solution can be assessed only in comparison
360 Stephen Labaton, U.S. Bank Bailout Hurt by Weakness of Insurance Fund, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
25, 1991, at Al, col. B.
361 Even in negotiations in "non-legal" fora, the law serves as an indispensable backdrop, inform-
ing the parties' expectations. See generally, Robert H. Mnookin and Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining
in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 Yale L.J. 950 (1979).
362 The bankruptcy analogy is also illuminative on this point, however, for bankruptcy is not
without stigma, and the "fresh start" policy that underpins bankruptcy law is, in significant measure,
a paternalistic one. See Thomas H. Jackson, The Fresh Start Policy in Bankruptcy Law, 98
HARVARD L. REv. 1393, 1405 (1985).
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with its alternatives. The alternative of unilateral, unprogrammed de-
fault poses a greater threat to the international banking system and is so
unattractive to both lenders and borrowers that they have sought desper-
ately to avoid it. Instead, they have endeavored to maintain their rela-
tionships and have developed, out of practical necessity, the policy of
"conciliatory default." '63 This is, in effect, a policy of adjustment. It is
too important a policy, however, to be administered on an ad hoc basis
by interested parties.
VIII. CONCLUSION
It is not the purpose of this article to blame all of sub-Saharan Af-
rica's problems on "outsiders."'364 A recent report by the United Nations
Development Program concluded that the LDCs could mobilize 50 bil-
lion dollars per year for development if they changed their spending pri-
orities.365 In addition, many LDC governments suffer from corruption
and/or managerial ineptitude or, as Benin's Minister of Industry, Energy
and Public Enterprises put it, "a quasi-absence of efficient management
and control systems.... "366 However, just as African governments must
take primary responsibility for addressing their own internal political
shortcomings, the developed world must, in fairness, consider the sub-
stantial evidence that the LDCs are not just "less developed" - they are
structurally retarded as a direct result of their historical and present rela-
tionship to the developed countries.
The simplest reason to adjust the external debt of sub-Saharan Af-
rica is that there is no realistic possibility of the debt ever being repaid.
The choice, therefore, ultimately comes down to one between (1) system-
atic adjustment and discharge of the debt, and (2) unilateral, unpro-
grammed default. The long-term interests of the developed world,
generally, and the United States, specifically, are best served by investing
363 See supra note 14.
364 Even the Institute for African Alternatives has acknowledged "[t]he partial responsibility of
African governments for the current crisis... with respect to their neglect of rural areas, pervasive
corruption, excessive bureaucratization, distorted national priorities and misplaced reliance on for-
eign capital." ONIMODE, supra note 10, at 192.
365 Steve Mufson, Study Faults Third World Priorities, U.N. Program Cites Military Spending,
WASH. Posr, May 23, 1991, at A39. Specifically, the report blames high military spending and poor
distribution of social services for much of the human suffering in the LDCs. Id. The countries of
sub-Saharan Africa could also benefit significantly from increased trade among themselves. "[Tirade
within the continent is a mere 5% of all black Africa's export trade, and is static, although some 200
organizations exist to promote it." Africa's New Drumbeat, supra note 350, at 46. See generally,
Joanna Moss & John Ravenhill, Trade Diversification in Black Africa, 27 J. MOD. AFR. STUD. 3, 521
(1989).
366 Klaus D. Stein, Fiscal Affairs Department Conducts Seminar on Public Expenditure Manage-
ment in Africa, IMF SuRVEY, Aug. 12, 1991, at 245.
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in the economic health and political stability of the world's least devel-
oped countries.367 The principal appeal of an approach resulting in sub-
stantial discharge of the debt through equitable adjustment based on
contractual principles is that it is a real solution based on established
principles, rather than a stop-gap measure based on expedience.
367 See generally, F.V. GARCIA-AMADOR, THE EMERGING INTERNATIONAL LAW OF DEVELOP-
MENT, A NEW DIMENSION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1990); Charles F. Meissner, Crisis as an
Opportunity for Change, 17 INT'L L. & POL. 613 (1985).
